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George F. Wilhere and Timothy Quinn * 
HOW WIDE IS WIDE ENOUGH?: SCIENCE, 
VALUES, AND LAW IN RIPARIAN HABITAT 
CONSERVATION 
ABSTRACT 
 
Difficult environmental policy issues often elicit fervent 
declarations to “follow the science.” Such declarations ignore 
the essential role of values in policy making. The main purpose of 
this article is to clarify the relationships among science, values, 
and law in environmental policy. An important policy issue in 
wildlife conservation, is determining “how much is enough?” 
That is, what is the smallest amount of habitat or minimum 
population size that is adequate for the long-term survival of 
wildlife populations? This paper presents three case studies in 
which policy makers decided how much was enough for 
protecting freshwater salmonid habitats. The case studies are the 
federal Northwest Forest Plan, the Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP) for Washington’s forested trust lands, and the HCP for 
Washington’s forest practices rules. Because all three plans were 
developed for the same habitats and species in the same region 
over a span of roughly seven years, all drew from the same body 
of science. Hence, the differences among the conservation plans 
cannot be attributed to differences in the available science. We 
explain how differences in habitat conservation were largely due 
to differences in societal values that were expressed through 
different legal frameworks. The legal frameworks established 
unique policy decision spaces for each plan. Strong leadership, 
vague or ambiguous statutory language, and commitments to 
adaptive management expanded the decision space for policy 
makers. Our case studies also show how values affected each 
plan through negotiations amongst stakeholders and/or 
leadership by key political figures. By appropriately integrating 
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science and values these conservation plans led to lawful 
resolutions of a difficult environmental policy issue but in 
different ways. The lessons learned are highly relevant to other 
environmental issues. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important question in wildlife1 conservation, perhaps the most 
important question, is “how much is enough?” In other words, what is the 
minimum population size, land area, or habitat quality that are both necessary and 
sufficient for the long-term survival of self-sustaining wildlife populations? These 
types of questions are the fundamental basis for many of the most contentious 
wildlife management issues in recent history—such as conservation of the northern 
spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina), gray wolf (Canis lupus), and anadromous 
salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.). The central question for the spotted owl was, “how 
much old-growth forest is enough?” Finding an answer pitted the survival of the 
species against the timber industry and loggers it employed.2 For the gray wolf, the 
current controversy focuses on how much of the species’ historical geographic 
range must be occupied by wolves to achieve full recovery under the Endangered 
Species Act.3 The answer will affect the management of millions of acres of rural 
private and public land. The question for anadromous salmon is more multi-
dimensional; the question is not only “how much habitat is enough?” but also “how 
many hatcheries are too many?”, “how many dams are too many?”, and “how 
much salmon harvest is too much?”4 The answers for salmon will have major 
impacts on land use (residential, agricultural, forestry), water use, electric power 
generation, and fisheries (tribal, commercial, and recreational), throughout the 
Pacific Northwest Region of the United States. For each of these examples, the 
answers to “how much is enough?” have been extremely controversial because: 1) 
the answers determine what is won or what is lost and by whom; 2) the economic 
and social impacts stemming from those answers are often unevenly distributed 
among different economic sectors, stakeholder groups, or individual citizens; and 
3) the main actors in these controversies often fail to appreciate the proper roles of 
science and societal values in finding an answer. 
 
 1. “Wildlife” is broadly defined as all forms of nonhuman and nondomesticated animal life. See 
MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 4 (3d ed. 
1997). 
 2. See Erik Loomis & Ryan Edgington, Lives Under the Canopy: Spotted Owls and Loggers in 
Western Forests, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 99 (2012); Steven L. Yaffee, Lessons About Leadership from 
the History of the Spotted Owl Controversy, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 381 (1995). 
 3. See Jeremy T. Bruskotter et al., Removing Protections for Wolves and the Future of the U.S. 
Endangered Species Act (1973), 7 CONSERVATION LETTERS. 401 (2014); Martha Williams, Lessons 
from the Wolf Wars: Recovery v. Delisting under the Endangered Species Act, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 106 (2016). 
 4. See Mary H. Ruckelshaus et al., The Pacific Salmon Wars: What Science Brings to the 
Challenge of Recovering Species, 33 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 665 (2002). 
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“How much is enough?” is a policy question. Difficult policy questions 
often elicit fervent declarations to “follow the science.”5 For instance, regarding the 
removal of the gray wolf from the federal list of endangered and threatened species, 
Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell stated, “It’s about science and you do what 
the science says. . . . “6 However, because “endangered” and “threatened” are not 
scientific concepts and are not defined by the Endangered Species Act, federal 
regulations, or agency policy, the decision to “delist” is normative.7 That is, while 
delisting of a species should be informed by science, it is ultimately a values-based 
decision reflecting the decision-maker’s tolerance for risk.8 
When a policy maker says, “you do what the science says,” the 
implication is that science, and science alone, will lead policy makers to an 
objective, values-free, “un-politicized” policy. This belief reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of environmental policy.9 While credible scientific information 
is essential for formulating policy, science is just one input into a political process 
through which groups with different values compete to advance their preferred 
policies. Disputes over “the science” regularly occur, in particular, disputes over its 
interpretation or policy implications, but conflicts in environmental policy are 
almost always based on differing cultural values. To avoid political conflict, policy 
makers may attempt to convert a difficult policy issue into a scientific issue,10 but 
this recasting robs stakeholders and the public of an open, transparent, deliberative 
political process through which value-based conflicts may be resolved. 
Sound environmental policy must be based on an integration of science 
and societal values.11 Science alone cannot determine how much is enough, 
because the amount of habitat that humans ought to provide for other species is 
ultimately an ethical question. Compare the following two statements: “increasing 
the amount of old-growth forest by ten percent will decrease spotted owl extinction 
risk by four percent” and “we must preserve ten percent more old-growth forest to 
save the spotted owl from extinction.” The first statement describes an ecological 
relationship between habitat area and species survival; it is amoral. The second 
statement prescribes what society ought to do for the spotted owl; it makes an 
implicit distinction between right and wrong behavior. The first statement is purely 
scientific, but the second is a policy statement based on both science and values. In 
this example, societal values may include our ethical obligations to be good 
 
 5. Robin Gregory et al., Some Pitfalls of an Overemphasis on Science in Environmental Risk 
Management Decisions, 9 J. RISK RES. 717, 718–19 (2006); see Brian J. Boyle, Fresh Perspectives, 
Encouraging Diversity and Scientific Analysis in Support of Formulating Policy, in RIPARIAN 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT SYMPOSIUM 7 (Douglas F. Ryan & John M. Calhoun eds., 2010), https://
www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr830.pdf. 
 6. John McArdle, Little Lucy Puts Interior Chief on Record on Wolf Delisting, GREENWIRE (June 
26, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059983517. 
 7. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science 
Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1112–29 (1997). 
 8. Id. at 1117. 
 9. See Gregory et al., supra note 5, at 720–22; Donald Ludwig et al., Ecology, Conservation, and 
Public Policy, 32 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 481, 482–84 (2001); George F. Wilhere, The 
How-Much-is-Enough Myth, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 514 (2008). 
 10. Ludwig et al., supra note 9, at 494. 
 11. See id. at 494–95; Wilhere, supra note, 9. 
282 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 58 
stewards of nature, to conserve natural resources for future generations, or to 
sustainably manage wildlife for society’s benefit. 
The main purpose of this article is to clarify the relationships among 
science, values, and law in environmental policy making. While much has already 
been written on this topic, we believe further guidance is needed. Secretary 
Jewell’s statement regarding delisting of wolves and our own professional 
experiences indicate that misconceptions about the proper roles of science and 
values persist even at the highest level of policy making. Part I of this article 
introduces the problem, which is that some policy makers, as well as scientists12 
and the general public, still do not understand the proper roles of science and 
values in policy making. Part I also introduces a fundamental policy question in 
wildlife conservation—”How much is enough?”—that forms the core of our 
discussion on environmental policy making. Three case studies in Part III arrive at 
different answers to this question. Part II explains the meanings of “science” and 
“values.” We ascribe four distinct meanings to “values,” and describe what we, the 
authors, specifically mean by “values” in this article. 
Part III begins by describing the issue of riparian area conservation. We 
then describe in detail three separate riparian area conservation plans for federal, 
state, and private managed forest lands in Washington State, and summarize their 
major similarities and differences. Understanding how these similarities and 
differences came to be clarifies the nexus of science, values, and law in 
environmental policy making. The three conservation plans are similar in 
fundamental ways—all deal with riparian and aquatic habitats, address the habitat 
needs of imperiled salmonids, comply with the Endangered Species Act, establish 
policies or rules for forest management, are millions of acres in size, are located in 
Washington State, and were developed during the 1990s. Most importantly, 
because all three plans were developed for the same habitats and species in the 
same region over a span of roughly seven years, they were drawn from the same 
body of science to inform policy development. These similarities (i.e., habitats, 
species, land use, size, location, time, science) are “control variables” that remain 
constant across the three plans. These control variables enable a comparison of 
plans through which the effects of different laws and values on policy making are 
made more clearly evident. Specifically, we posit that significant differences in the 
level of habitat protection among these otherwise comparable conservation plans 
are due to societal values expressed through law and the cultural values of the 
stakeholders and government officials involved in their development. Although the 
three case studies deal exclusively with forest management, the lessons learned 
about the role of values are highly relevant to other land uses. Other important 
lessons pertain to political leadership, negotiations amongst stakeholders, and 
adaptive management. 
In Part IV, we examine how societal values influenced the amount of 
riparian habitat protection provided by each plan, and how the plans’ unique legal 
frameworks (existing statutes, regulations, and common law) were the primary 
 
 12. See George F. Wilhere, Inadvertent Advocacy, 26 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 39 (2012) 
[hereinafter Wilhere, Inadvertent Advocacy]; George F. Wilhere et al., The Conflation of Values and 
Science: Response to Noss et al., 26 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 943 (2012). 
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mechanisms for expressing those values. The legal frameworks created decision 
spaces for political leaders and/or stakeholders that limited the solutions available 
to them. As we explain, however, vague or ambiguous statutory language expanded 
the decision space and bold leadership tested the boundaries of that space. Part V is 
a summary of our main findings and conclusions. 
II. SCIENCE AND VALUES 
Good environmental policy decisions require: 1) factual information 
regarding the anticipated impacts or outcomes of proposed policy options (i.e., 
science); 2) an understanding of stakeholders’ priorities and preferences (i.e., 
values); and 3) a process for using science and values to explore trade-offs amongst 
policy options.13 Here, we describe the foundation of sound policy: science and 
values. 
A. Science 
Science may be viewed as either a body of knowledge or as a rigorous, 
standardized way of acquiring that knowledge.14 Science attempts to provide 
factual descriptions or objective explanations of the physical world as it is. 
According to seventy-two Nobel Laureates in science: “Science is devoted to 
formulating and testing naturalistic explanations for natural phenomena. It is a 
process for systematically collecting and recording data about the physical world, 
then categorizing and studying the collected data in an effort to infer the principles 
of nature that best explain the observed phenomena.”15 
Findings from rigorous empirical research that uses the scientific method 
are widely believed to provide the most reliable understanding of natural systems.16 
There are certain features of science that distinguish it from other methods of 
inquiry. The various scientific disciplines are alike in their reliance on evidence, the 
building and testing of theories, and principles of logical reasoning.17 
A scientific theory is an explanation of some aspect of the natural world 
that is well-substantiated by objective evidence. A basic tenet of science is that 
scientific theories must be testable or falsifiable. Theories that fail to explain new 
observations must be revised or discarded. As a result, science is a self-correcting 
process from which better explanations of natural phenomena gradually emerge. 
Science is a human endeavor, and consequently, it can never be entirely 
free of error or subjective bias. To address such problems, another common feature 
of modern science is peer-review, a process through which a scientist’s work is 
 
 13. Gregory et al., supra note 5, at 720. 
 14. Helen Quinn, What is Science?, 62 PHYSICS TODAY, no. 7, 2009, at 8; P.J. Sullivan et al., 
Defining and Implementing Best Available Science for Fisheries and Environmental Science, Policy, 
and Management, 31 FISHERIES 460, 460 (2006). 
 15. Amicus Curiae Brief of 72 Nobel Laureates et al. in Support of Appellees at 23, Aguillard v. 
Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (No. 85-1513), 1986 WL 727658. 
 16. Dennis D. Murphy & Paul S. Weiland, Guidance on the Use of Best Available Science Under 
the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 58 ENVTL. MGMT. 1, 4 (2016). 
 17. See AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., SCIENCE FOR ALL AMERICANS: A PROJECT 
2061 REPORT ON LITERACY GOALS IN SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 13 (1989). 
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evaluated by other scientists to identify flaws in study design, data collection, data 
analysis, or its interpretation.18 Peer-review is also intended to minimize the 
influence of personal values on the quality of evidence and its interpretation. 
Ethical questions are not amenable to the scientific method, but science is 
still relevant to making ethical decisions.19 When developing an environmental 
policy, science can predict, with varying degrees of uncertainty, the potential 
consequences resulting from alternative policy choices, however, science cannot 
predict which consequences are good or bad, or which policies are right or wrong. 
Values are the ultimate basis for those judgments. 
B. Values 
In contrast to “science,” the meaning of “values” is much more 
ambiguous. A common use of “value” is mathematical, such as the value of x in the 
equation x + 2 = 5. Another familiar use of “value” is associated with physical 
measurements, which determine the “value” of an object’s mass, volume, 
temperature, or other physical attributes. In ecology, habitat “value” often refers to 
empirically-derived functional relationships that describe a species’ response to the 
physical environment. These uses of “value” are objective and unaffected by 
human preferences. 
In environmental policy, “value” has at least four different meanings. The 
first meaning is the objective uses of “value” described above. The second meaning 
of “value” denotes features, components, or qualities of the environment or 
ecosystems.20 This use of “value” often refers to things that are thought to be 
beneficial or important, but it may also refer to an object’s intrinsic value. “Natural 
heritage values,” for instance, refer to all elements of biodiversity, including plants, 
animals, fungi, microorganisms, biological communities, ecosystem types, genes, 
etc. Likewise, “ecological values” were defined by Cordell et al.21 as the level of 
benefits that space, water, minerals, biota, and all other factors that make up natural 
ecosystems provide to support native life forms. This meaning of “values” implies 
that natural heritage values and ecological values can be identified, measured, and 
managed.22 The third meaning of “value” encountered in environmental policy is 
relative worth, utility, or importance. This is the meaning most often used by 
economists, and is also referred to as economic value or instrumental value. 
Economic valuation measures the difference an object (tangible or intangible) 
 
 18. Sullivan et al., supra note 14, at 461; see Darren S. Ryder et al., Defining and Using ‘Best 
Available Science’: A Policy Conundrum for the Management of Aquatic Ecosystems, 61 MARINE & 
FRESHWATER RES. 821, 823 (2010). See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., 
IMPROVING THE USE OF THE “BEST SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE” STANDARD IN FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT (2004). 
 19. Quinn, supra note 14, at 9. 
 20. Joseph P. Reser & Joan M. Bentrupperbäumer, What and Where are Environmental Values? 
Assessing the Impacts of Current Diversity of Use of ‘Environmental’ and ‘World Heritage’ Values, 25 
J. OF ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 125, 128 (2005). 
 21. H. Ken Cordell et al., The Natural Ecological Value of Wilderness, in THE MULTIPLE VALUES 
OF WILDERNESS 205, 206 (H. Ken Cordell et al. eds., 2005). 
 22. Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, supra note 20, at 140. 
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makes to the satisfaction of human preferences.23 In other words, economic “value” 
expresses subjective beliefs about relative worth of an object. Monetization of 
ecosystem services is one way to measure the economic value of ecosystems. 
The fourth meaning of “values” is enduring conceptions of the 
preferable24 or desirable.25 This is the only meaning of “values” used in this article. 
This type of values is often called human values, societal values, or cultural values. 
Values, in this sense of the word, are relatively stable principles or standards that 
specify what is moral, just, or desirable, and consequently, influence personal and 
collective decisions.26 Values are also described as normative conceptions of what 
the world ought to be.27 That is, values are subjective beliefs about what is good or 
bad, what is right or wrong. Hence, ethical behavior is behavior consistent with 
societal or cultural values. Values are absorbed through socialization and deeply 
embedded into consciousness, and hence, are the deepest level of thinking and 
feeling about an issue.28 Values affect the economic worth of objects, including 
ecosystem services, through deeply held preference relationships.29 
Environmental policy makers often split the fourth meaning of values into 
three broad categories: ecological, economic, and social. We prefer Reser and 
Bentrupperbäumer’s definition of environmental/ecological values: “individual and 
shared community or societal beliefs about the significance, importance, and well-
being of the natural environment, and how the natural world should be treated by 
humans.”30 We created a similar definition for economic values: individual and 
shared community or societal beliefs about the significance, importance, and well-
being of the human economy, and how the human economy should be managed. 
“Human economy” refers to the production, distribution or trade, and consumption 
of goods and services, including ecosystem services, by people in a given 
geographical location. Our definition of social values is derived from the 
definitions of Bryan et al., van Riper et al., and Kenter et al.,31 individual and 
shared community or societal beliefs about the significance, importance, and well-
being of non-monetary (or non-monetized) use and non-use benefits that support 
human well-being, and how these non-monetary benefits should be managed. 
 
 23. See Stephen C. Farber et al., Economic and Ecological Concepts for Valuing Ecosystem 
Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 375, 376 (2002). 
 24. Thomas C. Brown, The Concept of Value in Resource Allocation, 60 LAND ECON. 231, 233 
(1984). 
 25. Steven Hitlin & Jane Allyn Piliavin, Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 
359, 362 (2004); James L. Spates, The Sociology of Values, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 27, 29 (1983). 
 26. Thomas Dietz et al, Environmental Values, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 335, 339–41 
(2005). 
 27. See Spates, supra note 25, at 29–30. 
 28. See generally ALMA WHITELEY, MANAGING CHANGE: A CORE VALUES APPROACH (1995). 
 29. Brown, supra note 24, at 233–34. 
 30. Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, supra note 20, at 141. 
 31. See Brett Anthony Bryan et al., Comparing Spatially Explicit Ecological and Social Values for 
Natural Areas to Identify Effective Conservation Strategies, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 172, 173 
(2011); Jasper O. Kenter et al., What are Shared and Social Values of Ecosystems?, 111 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 86, 88 (2015); Carena J. van Riper et al., Mapping Outdoor Recreationists’ Perceived Social 
Values for Ecosystem Services at Hinchinbrook Island National Park, Australia, 35 APPLIED 
GEOGRAPHY 164, 164–73 (2012). 
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Ecological, economic, and social values are categories of societal or 
cultural values. Societal values encompass all cultural values within a society. A 
homogenous society has one set of cultural values. In contrast, heterogeneous 
societies consist of multiple cultural groups with different cultural values that 
overlap to a greater or lesser degree with each other.32 At the root of many conflicts 
over habitat conservation are dissimilar values of different cultural groups,33 which 
are often synonymous with stakeholder groups. 
III. CASE STUDIES IN RIPARIAN AREA CONSERVATION 
Riparian areas are located at the boundary between water and land. 
Riparian ecosystems, which are coincident with riparian areas, act as the interface 
between aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, and include a portion of terrestrial 
ecosystems that significantly influences exchanges of energy and matter with 
aquatic ecosystems.34 Consequently, the condition of riparian areas directly 
impacts the quality of public resources such as water and fisheries. Furthermore, 
“[n]atural riparian corridors are the most diverse, dynamic, and complex 
biophysical habitats on the terrestrial portion of the earth[,]”35 and therefore, the 
conservation of riparian areas is critical to the conservation of biodiversity, in 
particular, aquatic biodiversity. 
The protection of water quality, fisheries, and aquatic biodiversity is often 
accomplished by establishing riparian buffers36 along the shorelines of lakes, 
rivers, or streams.37 Buffers established through government regulation for private 
lands or through agency policy for public lands are often controversial because they 
reduce the economic value of land within the buffer. The controversy almost 
always focuses on the width of the buffer because width affects both the level of 
protection for public resources and the amount of private or public land 
encumbered. In other words, determining “how wide is wide enough?” involves 
 
 32. See Kenter et al., supra note 31, at 87–88. 
 33. David Gritten et al., Ethical Analysis: A Structured Approach to Facilitate the Resolution of 
Forest Conflicts, 11 FOREST POL’Y ECON. 555, 555–60 (2009); James David Proctor, Environmental 
Values and Popular Conflict over Environmental Management: A Comparative Analysis of Public 
Comments on the Clinton Forest Plan, 22 ENVTL. MGMT. 347, 356 (1998). 
 34. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMM. ON RIPARIAN ZONE FUNCTIONING & STRATEGIES FOR MGMT., 
RIPARIAN AREAS FUNCTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR MANAGEMENT 33 (2002). 
 35. Robert J. Naiman et al., The Role of Riparian Corridors in Maintaining Regional Biodiversity, 
3 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 209, 209 (1993). 
 36. Riparian buffers are also known as riparian management zones (RMZs) or riparian reserves. 
Different terms were adopted by each of the three conservation plans we discuss. “Buffer” refers to its 
purpose, which is to reduce or prevent adverse impacts to water quality, fisheries, and aquatic 
biodiversity from human activities occurring upslope of the buffer. The purposes of RMZs and riparian 
reserves may also include reducing or preventing adverse impacts to riparian dependent plants and 
wildlife, or to ecosystem services such as flood mitigation. 
 37. See generally Paul W. Adams, Policy and Management for Headwater Streams in the Pacific 
Northwest: Synthesis and Reflection, 53 FOREST SCI. 104, 104–18 (2007); Philip Lee et al, Quantitative 
Review of Riparian Buffer Width Guidelines from Canada and the United States, 70 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 
165, 165–80 (2004). 
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policy trade-offs that affect the natural environment, public resources, private 
enterprise, and private property rights.38 
The question “how wide is wide enough?” for riparian buffers on rivers 
and streams is perhaps the most important policy question regarding the 
conservation of freshwater habitats for imperiled salmonid species. In Washington 
state, three different answers to that question were developed by three monumental 
conservation plans for freshwater habitats. The three plans (Table 1) are the Federal 
Northwest Forest Plan developed between 1992 and 1994 covering 1.8 million 
acres in Washington, the habitat conservation plan (HCP) for Washington’s 
forested trust lands developed between 1994 and 1997 covering 1.4 million acres, 
and the HCP for Washington’s forest practices rules developed between 1996 and 
1999 covering 9.3 million acres of nonfederal, nontribal land. Policy decisions for 
each of the conservation plans were informed by science, based on values, and 
constrained by existing law. 
A. The Northwest Forest Plan 
In July 1992, all timber sales of old-growth forest on national forests 
within the range of the northern spotted owl were enjoined by the U.S. District 
Court of Western Washington.39 Judge William Dwyer ruled that the U.S. Forest 
Service was in violation of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 40 Harvest of old-growth forest on 
national forests within the range of the northern spotted owl was prohibited until 
the Forest Service came into compliance with federal law. The court’s order, which 
culminated four years of litigation challenging the management of old-growth 
forests, ultimately affected 17.1 million acres of federal land in Washington, 
Oregon, and Northern California.41 For environmentalist organizations, the court 
injunction was a major victory in the so-called “spotted owl wars.”42 For managers 
of federal forests, Judge Dwyer’s ruling initiated a political crisis fomented by an 
unresolved conflict between ecological and economic values. 
 
 38. See Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, Science, Values, and Biodiversity, 48 BIOSCIENCE 441, 
441–44 (1998). See generally Ludwig et al., supra note 9; Wilhere, supra note 9. 
 39. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Mosely, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1493–94 (W.D. Wash. 1992). In June 
1992, the U.S. District Court of Oregon enjoined timber sales on lands administered by the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) within the geographic range of the northern spotted owl. Portland Audubon 
Soc’y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1510–11 (D. Or. 1992). The later ruling by Judge Dwyer was much 
more significant because the U.S. Forest Service managed seven times more land than the BLM within 
the range of the northern spotted owl. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FINAL 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF HABITAT FOR LATE-
SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD-GROWTH FOREST RELATED SPECIES WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN 
SPOTTED OWL 3&4-25 (1994). 
 40. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 798 F. Supp. at 1488. 
 41. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC . & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION FOR 
AMENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING DOCUMENTS 
WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL tbl.ROD-1 (1994), https://ia802704.us.archive
.org/18/items/recordofdecision08unit/recordofdecision08unit.pdf. 
 42. See generally STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL: POLICY LESSONS 
FOR A NEW CENTURY (1994). 
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and federal regulations issued under 
the NFMA demanded a high degree of protection for fish and wildlife species on 
federal lands. Section 7 of the ESA states, “Each Federal agency shall . . . insure 
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species. . . . “43 The northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet (Brachyramphus 
marmoratus), two species closely associated with old-growth forests,44 were listed 
as threatened under the ESA, and therefore, harvest of old-growth forest on federal 
lands could not jeopardize the continued existence of these two species. 
The National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning 
Rule stated: “Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable 
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the 
planning area.”45 Under this regulation, which was known as the NFMA’s 
“viability standard,” management plans for national forests were required to assess 
the impacts of future timber harvests on the population viability of vertebrate 
species, and the assessment had to credibly show that planned future timber harvest 
would maintain viable populations. At that time, 112 vertebrate species were 
thought to be closely associated with old-growth forest, including 29 fish species.46 
On the one hand, the protection of fish and wildlife species on federal 
lands was clearly articulated in federal law. On the other hand, the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act directed the Forest Service to manage for “the achievement 
and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of 
the various renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the 
productivity of the land.”47 Timber was considered the renewable resource on 
federal lands in the Pacific Northwest. Many rural economies depended on timber 
from federal lands, and influential members of Congress from Oregon and 
Washington expected the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) to provide that timber.48 The Forest Service had tried to achieve two 
 
 43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). “Jeopardize the continued existence of” is defined as “to engage 
in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the 
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild. . . . “ 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 
(2016). 
 44. See Leonard F. Ruggiero et al., Plant and Animal Habitat Associations in Douglas-Fir Forests 
of the Pacific Northwest: An Overview, in WILDLIFE AND VEGETATION OF UNMANAGED DOUGLAS-FIR 
FORESTS 447, 456 (Leonard F. Ruggerio et al. eds. 1991). 
 45. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982). The National Forest System Land and Resource Management 
Planning Rule was amended in 2000. National Forest System Land and Resource Management 
Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (Nov. 9, 2000). The amended rule replaced the viability standard with a 
requirement for “ecological, social, and economic sustainability.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000); see also 
George Hoberg, Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest Service Law: The Battle over the Forest Service 
Planning Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 1–27 (2004). However, several lawsuits challenging the 
amended rule delayed its implementation until 2009. National Forest System Land and Resource 
Management Planning, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,059 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
 46. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: AN 
ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT IV-144, IV-148, IV-151, IV-164, IV-171, IV-176, 
V-65 (1993), https://www.blm.gov/or/plans/nwfpnepa/FEMAT-1993/1993_%20FEMAT_Report.pdf. 
 47. 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (2012). 
 48. See Miles Burnett & Charles Davis, Getting the Cut Out: Politics and National Forest Timber 
Harvests: 1960-1995, 34 ADMIN. SOC. 202, 202–28 (2002); Elise S. Jones & Will Callaway, Neutral 
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conflicting goals—”viable populations” of vertebrate species and “high-level” 
timber production—but the federal court determined that national forest managers 
had not struck a lawful balance. 
When President Clinton assumed office in January 1993, timber harvest 
on federal lands in the Pacific Northwest was still enjoined by federal courts. In 
April 1993, he convened a Northwest Forest Conference in Portland, Oregon. At 
the conference numerous stakeholder groups, including environmentalists, the 
timber industry, the fishing industry, and local governments, were allowed to 
testify before the President.49 At that conference the President set forth five 
principles to guide the development of a management plan: 
 
1. First, we must never forget the human and economic dimensions of these 
problems. Where sound management policies can preserve the health of forest 
lands, sales should go forward. Where this requirement cannot be met, we need 
to do our best to offer new economic opportunities for year-round, high-wage, 
high-skill jobs. 
2. Second, as we craft a plan, we need to protect the long-term health of our 
forests, our wildlife, and our waterways. They are a . . . gift from God; and we 
hold them in trust for future generations. 
3. Third, our efforts must be, insofar as we are wise enough to know it, 
scientifically sound, ecologically credible, and legally responsible. 
4. Fourth, the plan should produce a predictable and sustainable level of 
timber sales and non-timber resources that will not degrade or destroy the 
environment. 
5. Fifth, to achieve these goals, we will do our best, as I said, to make the 
federal government work together and work for you. We may make mistakes 
but we will try to end the gridlock within the federal government and we will 
insist on collaboration not confrontation.50 
 
The President wanted a plan that would comply with federal law and 
strike the appropriate balance between protecting old-growth forests and providing 
a sustainable timber harvest from federal lands. In response to the President’s 
request, the Forest Service formed the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment 
Team (FEMAT), which developed and assessed ten options for the management of 
federal lands in the range of the northern spotted owl.51 The ten options presented a 
range of protection for wildlife habitats, from 6.0 to 13.3 million acres in reserves, 
and a range of timber harvest volumes, from 0.1 to 1.8 billion board feet per year.52 
Because the spotted owl and marbled murrelet were listed under the ESA, much of 
FEMAT focused on their habitats. However, due to the viability standard, impacts 
 
Bystander, Intrusive Micromanager, or Useful Catalyst?: The Role of Congress in Effecting Change 
Within the Forest Service, 23 POL’Y STUD. J. 337, 337–50 (1995). 
 49. YAFFEE, supra note 42, at 141–42. 
 50. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at 3. 
 51. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 46; Jack W. Thomas et al., 
The Northwest Forest Plan: Origins, Components, Implementation Experience, and Suggestions for 
Change, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOLGY 277, 277–87 (2006). 
 52. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at 20–24. 
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to 207 other species had to be assessed, including 7 salmonid species/subspecies. 
FEMAT’s report was a monumental achievement—weighing in at over 1,000 
pages and completed in 90 days. It was the foundation for the President’s 
Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP).53 
The habitat requirements of aquatic and riparian-dependent species were 
addressed by the Aquatic Conservation Strategy (ACS).54 The ACS was especially 
important because listing under the ESA of bull trout (Salvelinus confluentus) and 
several salmon subspecies appeared to be imminent.55 Three of the strategy’s nine 
goals were to: 1) maintain and restore plant communities in riparian areas to 
provide adequate shading, nutrients, and coarse woody debris, and appropriate rates 
of bank and surface erosion; 2) maintain and restore habitat connectivity for aquatic 
and riparian-dependent species; and 3) maintain and restore habitat to support well-
distributed populations of native plant, invertebrate, and vertebrate riparian-
dependent species.56 The first and second goals pertain to riparian areas, and the 
third goal refers to the NFMA’s viability standard. 
The ACS was based on two principles. The first principle addressed the 
natural variability of aquatic and riparian ecosystems. FEMAT said: “Stewardship 
of aquatic resources has the highest likelihood of protecting biological diversity 
and productivity when land use activities do not substantially alter the natural 
disturbance regime to which these organisms are adapted.”57 Therefore, FEMAT 
aimed to maintain and restore “ecosystem health” by maintaining and restoring 
disturbance processes such as floods, channel migration, landslides, and debris 
flows. 
The second principle articulated by FEMAT was that an effective 
conservation strategy must protect riparian ecosystem functions and processes. The 
five key functions or processes were root strength for stream bank integrity, litter 
 
 53. BRUCE G. MARCOT & JACK WARD THOMAS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OF SPOTTED OWLS, OLD 
GROWTH, AND NEW POLICIES: A HISTORY SINCE THE INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE REPORT 
10–12 (1997). 
 54. The ACS was largely based on an assessment by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERV., VIABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR SPECIES ASSOCIATED WITH LATE-SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD-GROWTH FORESTS OF THE PACIFIC 
NORTHWEST 427–82 (1993). 
 55. In 1993, salmonid species listings under the Endangered Species Act within the range of the 
northern spotted owl were indeed imminent. In June 1994, USFWS found that listing of bull trout as 
endangered or threatened in the conterminous United States was warranted but precluded. Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: 12-month Petition Finding on Bull Trout, 59 Fed. Reg. 30,254 
(June 10, 1994). Salmon species are listed by evolutionary significant units (ESUs) which are roughly 
the same as subspecies. In August 1996, NMFS proposed to list Upper Columbia River steelhead as 
endangered and Lower Columbia steelhead as threatened. Proposed Endangered Status for Five ESUs of 
Steelhead and Proposed Threatened Status for Five ESUs of Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, 
and California, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,541 (Aug. 9, 1996). The Southern Oregon and Northern California 
Coasts ESU of coho salmon was listed as threatened in 1997. Threatened Status for Southern 
Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 
24,588 (May 6, 1997). Since 1993, 23 ESUs for five species of salmon and 3 distinct population 
segments of bull trout have been listed under the ESA within the range of the northern spotted owl. 
Gordon H. Reeves et al., The Aquatic Conservation Strategy of the Northwest Forest Plan, 20 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 319, 320 (2006). 
 56. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at B-11. 
 57. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 46, at V-29. 
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fall to provide detrital nutrients, shading to limit stream temperatures, large wood 
recruitment, and sediment filtration (i.e., water quality).58 Using expert judgment 
informed by the scientific literature, FEMAT constructed graphical relationships 
that describe how four of the key functions or processes change with distance from 
the stream channel (Figure 1). The curves convey two important concepts: 1) the 
full contribution of riparian forest to these four riparian ecosystem functions or 
processes occurs within one tree height; and 2) the marginal return for each 
function or process decreases as distance from the stream channel increases (i.e., 
follows a law of diminishing marginal returns). 
FEMAT also considered microclimate as a function of riparian forest 
because microclimate was thought to influence the suitability of riparian areas for 
riparian-dependent wildlife (e.g., amphibians, small mammals).59 FEMAT’s 
microclimate curves show that the full contribution of riparian forest to the 
maintenance of microclimatic variables (e.g., air temperature, soil temperature, 
relative humidity) was thought to occur within two to three tree heights. 
The ACS established riparian reserves that are effectively no-timber-
harvest zones along all rivers and streams.60 FEMAT concluded that full protection 
of the five riparian ecosystem functions required minimum reserve widths equal to 
one site-potential61 tree height. A width of two site-potential tree heights was 
thought to be adequate for maintaining microclimate in riparian areas. FEMAT 
developed three management scenarios for riparian reserves, and all three applied 
the same width to fish-bearing streams—two site-potential tree heights or 300 ft., 
whichever is greater.62 The main differences amongst the scenarios were the 
riparian reserve widths on non-fish-bearing and intermittent streams. The most 
protective scenario specified a reserve width on all permanently flowing non-fish-
bearing streams of one site-potential tree height or 150 ft., whichever is greater, and 
a reserve width on intermittent streams of one site-potential tree height or 100 ft., 
whichever is greater.63 Site-potential tree height was defined as the average 
 
 58. Id. at V-26 to V-28. 
 59. See id. at V-28; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 54, at 446. 
 60. Standards and guidelines for the NWFP state that timber harvest is prohibited in riparian 
reserves except for silvicultural practices to acquire desired vegetation characteristics needed to attain 
ACS objectives, and salvage of dead or dying trees is allowed only when ACS objectives are not 
adversely affected. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at C-31 to C-32. 
Between 1994 and 2004 timber harvest occurred in only 1.8 percent of the estimated area of riparian 
reserves. See Gordon H. Reeves, The Aquatic Conservation Strategy of the Northwest Forest Plan: An 
Assessment After 10 years, in NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN − THE FIRST 10 YEARS (1994-2003): 
SYNTHESIS OF MONITORING AND RESEARCH RESULTS 181, 190–91 (Richard W. Haynes et al. eds., 
2006). 
 61. “Site potential” is a concept related to forest productivity. A site’s productivity is often 
expressed as the height a particular tree species growing on that site is expected to attain by a specified 
age. “Site class” refers to categories of site productivity. Site class I, for instance, has the highest 
productivity, while site classes II, III, IV, and V have successively lower productivity. 
 62. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 46, at 43. 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at C-30 to C-31. Widths of 
riparian reserves were described as “interim” until watershed and site analyses were completed. Id. at B-
21. The interim widths could be tailored to local conditions using the scientific results of these analyses, 
however, the burden of proof for reducing the interim widths was large, and consequently, nearly all 
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maximum height of the tallest dominant trees (200 years old or greater). Heights of 
dominant trees in riparian old-growth forest of Washington roughly range from 100 
to 240 ft.,64 depending on site class. 
In April 1994, the Secretaries of the Departments of the Interior and 
Agriculture adopted Alternative 9 (Option 9, but with the most protective scenario 
for non-fish-bearing and intermittent streams) as the NWFP. The Secretaries’ 
Record of Decision states: “Alternative 9 . . . is the best alternative for providing a 
sustainable level of human use of the forest resource while still meeting the need to 
maintain and restore the late-successional and old-growth forest ecosystem.”65 
Alternative 9 was a compromise between the area of upland late-successional forest 
reserves and timber harvest volume. Amongst the ten alternatives, Alternative 9 
ranked sixth for the amount of reserves and ranked third for the amount of annual 
timber harvest. Mean likelihood of viability for the seven salmonid 
species/subspecies assessed was eighty-one percent, which ranked second amongst 
the ten alternatives.66 
In FEMAT’s assessment, if a species had at least an eighty percent 
likelihood of a stable, well-distributed population over 100 years, then that species 
was considered viable. FEMAT believed it likely that alternatives attaining the 
eighty percent likelihood for a particular species “would be viewed as meeting the 
[viability standard]” for that species.67 No other justification for the eighty percent 
viability threshold was given. Scientists on the FEMAT team chose eighty percent 
because they believed it was reasonable, and their choice was later approved by 
U.S. Department of Justice lawyers who were responsible for ensuring the NWFP 
met the requirements of federal law.68 
After adoption of Alternative 9, environmentalist groups immediately 
sued the Secretaries of the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture to challenge 
the plan’s lawfulness. A timber industry organization also sued the Secretary of the 
Interior, and the cases were heard together in the U.S. District Court of Western 
Washington.69 One claim of the environmentalist plaintiffs was that the eighty 
percent viability threshold was too low. Judge Dwyer disagreed, writing that the 
government cannot be “held to a degree of certainty that is ultimately illusory.”70 
 
riparian reserves remain the full “interim” width. See Nancy Molina et al., Key Management 
Implications of the Northwest Forest Plan, in NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN, supra note 60, at 243, 262. 
 64. RICHARD E. MCARDLE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE YIELD OF DOUGLAS FIR IN THE 
PACIFIC NORTHWEST 13 fig.2 (rev. 1961), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/162739/files/tb201.pdf; 
Martin J. Fox, Spatial Organization, Position, and Source Characteristics of Large Woody Debris in 
Natural Systems 67 (Aug. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file 
with Allen Library, University of Washington). 
 65. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at 26–27. In the 
environmental impact statement for the Northwest Forest Plan the FEMAT options were renamed 
“alternatives.” See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 39. 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 39, at 3&4-196. 
 67. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 46, at 28. 
 68. E-mail from Martin Raphael, Deputy Team Leader, FEMAT, U.S. Forest Serv., Olympia 
Forestry Sciences Lab., to George F. Wilhere (June 29, 2015) (on file with author). 
 69. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
 70. Id. at 1321. 
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However, he also warned that the plan’s uncertainties must be adequately 
addressed, writing: 
The effectiveness of the [Aquatic Conservation Strategy] is still 
subject to debate among scientists. If the plan as implemented is 
to remain lawful the monitoring, watershed analysis, and 
mitigating steps called for by the Record of Decision will have to 
be faithfully carried out, and adjustments made if necessary.71 
In December 1994, Judge Dwyer ultimately ruled in favor of the 
Secretaries, concluding that they acted within the lawful scope of their discretion in 
adopting the NWFP.72 As of September 2018, the NWFP continues to govern 
forest management on Forest Service and BLM lands within the range of the 
northern spotted owl. 
The NWFP promised to address uncertainty through a process known as 
adaptive management, which it described as a continual process of planning, 
monitoring, evaluation and adjustment with the purpose of achieving the plan’s 
goals.73 After four years of monitoring program development, effectiveness 
monitoring for the ACS began in 2000.74 Eighteen years of adaptive management 
have led to no major adjustments to the ACS.75 
 
Figure 1: The “FEMAT Curves”: generalized curves showing riparian 
forest contributions to riparian ecosystem functions and processes as distance 
from a stream channel increases. “Tree height” refers to average maximum 
height of the tallest dominant trees (200 years old or greater). There was no 
curve for the sediment filtration (i.e., water quality) function.# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71. Id. at 1322. 
 72. Id. at 1300. 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 41, at E-12. 
 74. KIRSTEN GALLO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN: THE FIRST 10 
YEARS (1994–2003): PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDITION OF WATERSHEDS 4 (2005); see 
GORDON H. REEVES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EFFECTIVENESS MONITORING FOR THE AQUATIC 
AND RIPARIAN COMPONENT OF THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN 40 (2004). 
 75. See GORDON H. REEVES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL 
OPTIONS FOR MANAGING RIPARIAN RESERVES OF THE AQUATIC CONSERVATION STRATEGY OF THE 
NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN (2016). 
 #.    U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: AN 
ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT V-27 (1993). 
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B. Washington’s Forested State Trust Lands HCP 
The Washington State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) manages 
about 2.1 million acres of commercial forest land. Most of these forests are “trust 
lands” that generate income for trust beneficiaries, which are various public 
institutions such as kindergarten through 12th grade public schools and the state’s 
two major universities. Under the common law obligations of a trustee, DNR must 
act with undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries by striving to obtain the most 
substantial financial support possible from the trust property over time, while 
exercising ordinary prudence and taking necessary precautions for the preservation 
of the trust estate.76 Exercising ordinary prudence includes complying with all 
environmental regulations; preventing losses of ecological function, which may 
contribute to the listing of species as threatened or endangered; and avoiding 
circumstances likely to lead to public demand for increased restrictions on forest 
management.77 DNR’s common law obligations to the trust beneficiaries are often 
referred to as its “trust mandate.” 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the spotted owl conflict, which had been 
confined to federal lands, spread to Washington’s forested trust lands as well. In 
1988, DNR under the threat of legal action by environmentalist groups agreed to 
defer harvest of spotted owl habitat in its Olympic Region.78 These deferred timber 
sales were worth approximately $60 million in potential revenue79 (equivalent to 
$122 million in 2018).80 In 1990, the northern spotted owl was listed as a 
threatened species under the ESA. Consequently, under the ESA’s Section 9,81 
timber harvest might be prohibited on 302,000 to 485,000 acres of DNR-managed 
land.82 Furthermore, in response to the federal listing, the Washington Forest 
Practices Board, an independent state agency that oversees the state’s regulation of 
forest practices on nonfederal and non-tribal lands, initiated a rule-making process 
for the protection of spotted owl habitat. An economic analysis estimated that the 
proposed rules could reduce income to the state trusts by $41 million to $149 
 
 76. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE FORESTS 15 (2006); see State’s Trust 
Responsibilities with Respect to Lands Granted by the United States or Placed in Trust Through State 
Legislation, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. Wash. (1996); see also B. Bruce Bare et al., Equitably Treating 
Individual Washington State Forest Trusts Through Consolidated Management: A Conceptual 
Approach, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 479, 479–97 (2000). 
 77. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 76, at 15. 
 78. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., COMMISSION ON OLD GROWTH ALTERNATIVES FOR 
WASHINGTON’S FOREST TRUST LANDS 30 (1989). 
 79. Id. at 22. 
 80. Past monetary values adjusted to 2018 values with U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. 
In 1988, DNR and environmentalist groups agreed to defer the timber harvest scheduled for 1989. 
Hence, we assumed that the $60 million in deferred revenue was in 1989 dollars. 
 81. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012) (stating that it is unlawful for any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States to take any endangered wildlife species). This subsection is generally 
applied to threatened species as well through the ESA’s Section 4(d)). 
 82. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FINAL (MERGED) ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: 
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, VOL. 1, 4-6, 4-190, 4-319, 4-333 (1998). 
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million per year in 1992 dollars83 (equivalent to $74 million to $268 million per 
year in 2018). 
In 1992, the marbled murrelet was also listed as a threatened species under 
the ESA. This resulted in additional disruptions to DNR’s timber sales and lost 
revenue for the trust beneficiaries. Furthermore, the listing of anadromous salmon 
and bull trout as threatened or endangered under the ESA appeared to be imminent. 
State forest managers worried that if a salmonid species were listed under the ESA, 
then the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) might issue an advisory 
statement for avoiding incidental take,84 and that this advisory would describe 
buffers similar to the recently proposed riparian reserves of FEMAT. A salmonid 
species listing west of the Cascade Crest could affect over 12,000 miles of streams, 
including 1,410 miles of fish-bearing streams, on 1.4 million acres of DNR-
managed forest.85 
In 1992, Jennifer Belcher was elected as the Commissioner of Public 
Lands, which is the office that administers and directs DNR. Belcher assumed 
office in 1993, and during her first year she initiated development of a habitat 
conservation plan (HCP) that would resolve DNR’s spotted owl, marbled murrelet, 
and salmonid crisis. The HCP was Commissioner Belcher’s top priority.86 
Under Section 10 of the ESA,87 incidental take of federally-listed 
endangered or threatened species may be permitted subject to federal approval of 
an HCP. An HCP is the basis for a contract between an applicant (typically a land 
owner) and the federal agencies responsible for protecting listed species, USFWS 
or NMFS (jointly known as the Services). The contract (called an ‘‘implementation 
agreement’’) allows a permittee (formerly the applicant) to degrade or destroy 
habitat, thereby causing incidental take, in exchange for conservation measures that 
minimize and mitigate the habitat loss. According to Section 10(a)(2)(B), issuance 
of an incidental take permit requires that: (1) the taking of federally listed species is 
incidental to otherwise lawful activities; (2) the taking is, to the maximum extent 
practicable, minimized and mitigated; (3) the taking will not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild; (4) adequate 
funding for the conservation plan is ensured; and (5) other measures required by 
the Services as being necessary and appropriate for the purposes of the plan are 
met. 88 Other measures usually include implementation and effectiveness 
monitoring of the HCP. 
 
 83. See BRUCE LIPPKE & RICHARD S. CONWAY JR., WASH. WILDLIFE COMM. OF THE FOREST 
PRACTICES BD., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE FOREST PRACTICE RULES TO PROTECT 
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL SITES 7 tbl.5 (1994). 
 84. “Incidental take” is taking of a listed species that “is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the 
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012). “Take” means “to 
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct.” Id. § 1532(19)). 
 85. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FINAL HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, at III.70 to III.72 
(1997), https://www.dnr.wa.gov/publications/lm_hcp_plan_1997.pdf. 
 86. See Jennifer M. Belcher, Turning the Ship Around: Changing the Policies and Culture of a 
Government Agency to Make Ecosystem Management Work, 2 CONSERVATION IN PRAC. 17, 17–25 
(2001). 
 87. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2012). 
 88. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B). 
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DNR’s HCP was affected significantly by the national political context. 
When President Clinton assumed office in January 1993, the ESA was under 
attack.89 Many Republicans declared the ESA was a menace to both jobs and 
private property, and some Republicans in Congress were determined to weaken it 
through amendment. In 1982, a more progressive Congress had amended the ESA 
to allow HCPs,90 but by January 1993, only fourteen incidental take permits had 
been issued by the Services.91 Clinton’s Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, 
recognized that HCPs could be used to counter threats to the ESA. He promoted 
HCPs as negotiated solutions tailored to the unique circumstances of private 
landowners affected by endangered or threatened species.92 Babbitt made HCPs 
more appealing by adopting the “No Surprises Policy,” which provided landowners 
with greater regulatory certainty,93 and by promoting principles to “minimize social 
and economic impacts” upon private property, “treat landowners fairly and with 
consideration,” and “create incentives for landowners.”94 USFWS staff working on 
HCPs were encouraged to focus on customer service and increase the number of 
approved HCPs.95 Babbitt’s strategy was effective. By the end of 1999, 259 HCPs 
had been approved,96 and the Republicans’ anti-ESA fervor had subsided. 
DNR hoped to develop an HCP for 1.6 million acres of state trust that 
would enable it to generate the greatest feasible income for the trusts while fully 
complying with the ESA. The agency developed separate conservation strategies 
for spotted owls, marbled murrelets, salmonids, and a “multi-species” strategy that 
provided habitats for forty-nine other at-risk wildlife species. The latter three 
strategies were developed for state trust lands in western Washington only.97 
 
 89. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592, 10593–95 (1999); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat 
Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 279, 279–81 (1998). 
 90. See Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the 
Endangered Species Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 767, 773–76 (1997); Sheldon, supra note 89, at 295–99. 
 91. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES 
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 18–20 (1994), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/220827.pdf 
 92. J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the Post-Babbittonian Era - Are There Any?, 
14 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 419, 430–34 (2004). 
 93. Baur & Donovan, supra note 90, at 776–82, Sheldon, supra note 89, at 315–20. 
 94. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, PROTECTING AMERICA’S LIVING HERITAGE: A FAIR, COOPERATIVE 
AND SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3–4 (1995), 
https://www.fws.gov/policy/npi96_06.pdf. This document explains ten principles to carry out the ESA 
of which three are listed. 
 95. JEREMY ANDERSON & STEVEN YAFFE, UNIV. OF MICH., SCH. OF NAT. RES., BALANCING THE 
PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE INTEREST: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING 
21 (1998). 
 96. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning 
and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242 (June 1, 2000). 
 97. Marbled murrelets do not exist in eastern Washington. Because of differences in forest types 
and management practices between western and eastern Washington, DNR decided not to develop 
riparian and multi-species conservation strategies for DNR-managed forest lands east of the crest of the 
Cascades Mountains. Also, the riparian conservation strategy for the Olympic Experimental State Forest 
(OESF), covering 264,000 acres, was different than the strategy for other parts of western Washington, 
covering 1.14 million acres. For simplicity, we describe only the strategy for western Washington 
excluding the OESF. 
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DNR’s riparian conservation strategy specified two conservation goals: 1) 
maintain or restore salmonid freshwater habitat on DNR-managed forestlands; and 
2) contribute to the conservation of other aquatic and riparian obligate species.98 
One purpose of DNR’ s riparian management zone (RMZ) was “to maintain or 
restore the ecological functions in riparian and upland areas that directly influence 
salmonid freshwater habitat.”99 Five functions of riparian ecosystems were 
specifically addressed: stream bank integrity, providing detrital nutrients, sediment 
filtration (i.e., interception), shading, and delivery of large woody debris (LWD).100 
The RMZ consisted of a “riparian buffer” that would maintain the five functions, 
and a “wind buffer” on the RMZ’s windward side that would protect the riparian 
buffer on fish-bearing streams at sites with a “moderate potential” for windthrow. 
The riparian buffer was broken into three areas: a twenty-five foot wide no-harvest 
area adjacent to the stream channel, a seventy-five foot wide minimal-harvest area 
where up to ten percent of timber volume may be harvested, and farthest from the 
channel, a low-harvest area where up to twenty-five percent of timber volume may 
be harvested.101 Up to fifty percent of the timber volume in the wind buffer could 
be harvested. 
Like FEMAT’s riparian reserves, the width of DNR’s riparian buffer on 
fish-bearing streams (Types 1, 2, and 3)102 was based on “site-potential tree 
height,” however, unlike FEMAT, which used potential height of “old-growth” 
trees, DNR used the potential height of mature trees, where “mature” was defined 
as 100 years old. Consequently, the maximum site-potential height for DNR’s HCP 
was 215 feet.103 In contrast, FEMAT’s maximum site-potential height could be 240 
ft. or more.104 DNR set the minimum width of the riparian buffer at 100 feet, and 
therefore, the buffer width would range from 100 to 215 ft., with an average width 
on fish-bearing streams between 150 and 160 ft.105 The wind buffer was 100 ft. 
wide on Type 1 and 2 waters and 50 ft. wide on Type 3 waters wider than 5 ft. The 
riparian buffer width on non-fish-bearing, perennial or intermittent streams wider 
than 2 ft. (Type 4 waters) was set to 100 ft. No buffer was required on non-fish-
bearing streams narrower than 2 ft. (Type 5 waters), but DNR promised to protect 
 
 98. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.55. 
 99. Id. at IV.70. 
 100. Id. Large woody debris (LWD), also known as coarse woody debris (CWD), is usually defined 
as greater than 4 inches in diameter and greater than 6.5 feet in length. However, there is no universal 
definition of LWD. 
 101. Id. at IV.56 to IV.61. 
 102. At the time of the HCP’s development and approval, Washington’s forest practices rules 
classified surface waters as Types 1 through 5. Types 1, 2, and 3 were fish-bearing waters, and Types 4 
and 5 were non-fish-bearing. In general, Type 1s were the widest streams and Type 5s were the 
narrowest. 
 103. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.72. 
 104. MCARDLE ET AL., supra note 64, at 13 fig.2. 
 105. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.72. The range for the average riparian buffer 
width on fish-bearing streams was later revised to an average of 145 ft. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES FOR THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN RIPARIAN FOREST 
RESTORATION STRATEGY 17 (2006), https://www.dnr.wa.gov/publications/lm_hcp_rfrs.pdf. 
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Type 5 streams “when necessary for water quality, fisheries habitat, stream banks, 
wildlife, and other important elements of the aquatic system.”106 
DNR explained that a 150 to 160 ft. riparian buffer should fully maintain 
the riparian processes and functions of stream bank integrity, detrital nutrients, 
sediment filtration, and shade on fish-bearing streams, however, the quantity of 
LWD recruitment was expected to “approximate” that provided by old-growth 
riparian forest. Citing McDade et al.107 as scientific support, DNR estimated that its 
proposed RMZ would provide more than ninety percent of the natural level of in-
stream LWD on fish-bearing streams and eighty percent on non-fish-bearing 
streams wider than two feet.108 
During negotiations between DNR and the Services, RMZs along Type 5 
streams was a particularly difficult issue. The Services wanted a riparian buffer. 
However, DNR was reluctant to protect Type 5 streams because they estimated that 
about forty percent (over 4,500 miles) of all streams within the HCP planning area 
were Type 5, and therefore, buffers on Type 5 streams would encumber thousands 
of acres of forest land. At that time there had been very little scientific research on 
site and watershed-level impacts of forest management along Type 5 streams. 
Hence, the disagreement between the two parties was largely based on uncertainty. 
From the Services’ perspective, under-protecting Type 5 streams could appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of listed fish species in 
downstream waters. From DNR’s perspective, over-protecting Type 5 waters 
would needlessly forego income for the trust beneficiaries. The two parties lacked a 
common scientific understanding that could provide a mutual starting point for 
negotiations. Both parties acknowledged this situation and reached a 
compromise—DNR would fund and conduct a ten-year research program to study 
the effects of forest management on Type 5 streams, and after ten years DNR 
would develop a long-term conservation strategy for Type 5 streams. Furthermore, 
DNR also agreed to adaptive management to address various uncertainties 
associated with timber harvest in RMZs.109 DNR began HCP implementation in 
1997, but as of September 2018, DNR has yet to complete a long-term 
conservation strategy for Type 5 streams. 
Stakeholders, special interest groups, and citizens were not directly 
involved in development of DNR’s HCP. The only formal public involvement 
occurred through the public review and comment requirements of Washington’s 
State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) and the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA).110 Comments on the HCP from the majority of tribes, 
 
 106. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.59 (internal citation omitted). 
 107. M. H. McDade et al., Source Distances for Coarse Woody Debris Entering Small Streams in 
Western Oregon and Washington, 20 CANADIAN J. FOREST RES. 326, 326–30 (1990). 
 108. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.71 to IV.72. 
 109. Id. at B.11.  
 110. Because the HCP entailed a permitting decision by federal agencies with potentially significant 
environmental impacts, a NEPA process was also required. State Environmental Policy Act, WASH. 
REV. CODE § 43.21c.110(1)(c) (2012), and National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4370m-4 
(2012), both require opportunities for public review of major environmental policy decisions. Formal 
comments on the HCP were submitted in writing but public opinion was also recorded through 
testimony at several public meetings held throughout Washington. 
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environmentalist groups, and individual citizens expressed their desire for more 
habitat protection.111 One environmentalist group recommended FEMAT’s 
approach to riparian protection.112 Unsurprisingly, the majority of comments from 
most timber industry organizations and trust beneficiaries expressed their belief 
that DNR’s HCP provided too much habitat protection. The Washington Forest 
Protection Association,113 a timber industry organization, said the Washington 
Forest Practices Rules, which required much narrower RMZs, provided adequate 
protection of public resources.114 
The Services communicated to DNR that its HCP met the five criteria of 
the ESA’s Section 10(a)(2)(B) for spotted owl, marbled murrelets, and salmonids. 
Consequently, if any fish species was listed as endangered or threatened under the 
ESA, then the Services would issue to DNR an incidental take permit for that 
species. 
On the DNR side of the negotiations, the decision to approve and adopt 
the HCP was the responsibility of Washington’s Board of Natural Resources, 
which is comprised of six members, with four members representing the major 
trust beneficiaries. Threats of legal action by some county governments who obtain 
income from state trust lands reminded the Board of its “undivided loyalty” 
obligation to the trust beneficiaries. Furthermore, the trust mandate led many to 
believe that the Board could only approve and adopt an HCP which obtained the 
most substantial financial support possible from the trust property over time. The 
plan’s overall goals reflect the centrality of the trust mandate: 
 
1.  Providing certainty and stability in complying with the Endangered 
Species Act while producing substantial long-term income for the trust 
beneficiaries; 
2.  Allowing more predictable timber sales levels; 
3.  Ensuring future productivity of trust lands; 
4.  Keeping options open for future sources of income from trust lands; 
5.  Increasing management flexibility; and 
6.  Reducing the risk of loss to the trusts.115 
 
The Board was presented with three alternatives for the riparian 
conservation strategy: 1) the status quo, which followed Washington Forest 
Practices Rules for RMZs; 2) the HCP; and 3) the HCP plus site-potential tree 
height riparian buffers on non-fish-bearing streams, wind buffers on both sides of 
the RMZ, and effectively no-timber harvest in riparian buffers. An economic 
analysis showed that the HCP would provide seven percent more timber harvest 
volume than the status quo alternative and twenty-eight percent more harvest 
 
 111. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., VOL. 2, supra note 82, at 3–7., https://www.dnr.wa.gov/publica
tions/lm_hcp_meis_volume2_comments_1.pdf 
 112. Id. at 3-126 to 3-127. 
 113. The Washington Forest Protection Association (WFPA) is a trade association representing 
approximately fifty large and small timber companies and commercial forestland owners. It was 
founded in 1908 to protect private forestlands from wildfire. 
 114. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., VOL. 2, supra note 82, at 3-127. 
 115. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at II.3. 
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volume than the more environmentally protective alternative.116 Consequently, in 
1996, the Board approved and adopted the HCP. 
In January 1997, DNR and the Services signed the HCP’s implementation 
agreement.117 Secretary Babbitt was present at the signing ceremony. At that time, 
it was the nation’s largest HCP. In 1999, DNR was issued an incidental take permit 
for all listed salmon subspecies that is valid until 2067.118 As of September 2018, 
Washington State’s forested trust lands are still managed under the HCP. 
C. Washington’s Forests and Fish HCP 
In 1999, the Forests and Fish Report was announced to the public.119 The 
historic report was actually a recommendation to the Washington Forest Practices 
Board from DNR, the Washington Departments of Fish & Wildlife and Ecology, 
the Governor’s Office, the Washington State Association of Counties, the USFWS, 
NMFS, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Washington Forest 
Protection Association, Washington Farm Forestry Association, and nearly all 
treaty tribes in Washington120 on new forest practices rules that would achieve the 
following goals: 
 
1. Comply with the Endangered Species Act for aquatic and riparian-
dependent species. 
2. Support a harvestable supply of fish by restoring and maintaining riparian 
habitat. 
3. Meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act for water quality. 
4. Keep the timber industry economically viable in the state of Washington. 
 
The first and third goals address compliance with federal statues, the second goal 
addresses treaty rights of Indian tribes (explained below), and the fourth goal is 
derived from the Forest Practices Act which states: 
The legislature hereby finds and declares . . . a viable forest 
products industry is of prime importance to the state’s economy; 
that it is in the public interest for public and private commercial 
 
 116. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., VOL. 1, supra note 82, at 4-536. 
 117. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at B.1 to B.19. 
 118. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Section 10 Permit for Take of Endangered/Threatened Species, 
Permit no. 1168 (1999). 
 119. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FORESTS AND FISH REPORT (1999). The Forests and Fish Report is 
also known as the Forests and Fish Agreement. The regulations resulting from the report are variously 
known as the Forests and Fish Rules, Forests and Fish HCP, or the Washington Forest Practices HCP. 
 120. Three tribes—the Muckleshoot, Puyallup, and Tulalip—withdrew from the negotiation, but 
they ultimately decided not to oppose the agreement. Statement by John Mankowski, Former Natural 
Resources Advisor to Washington Governor Christine Gregoire, to George F. Wilhere. All 
environmentalist organizations also withdrew from the negotiations over the proper use of scientific 
information in developing policy and their skepticism regarding adaptive management of the new rules. 
Kira Furman, Social Learning as a Tool to Understand Complex Adaptive Management Institutions 15 
(2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Simon Frasier University) (on file with author)). Environmentalist 
organizations later rejoined the Timber, Fish, and Wildlife process after the Forests and Fish Report was 
announced to the public. 
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forestlands to be managed consistent with sound policies of 
natural resource protection; that coincident with maintenance of a 
viable forest products industry, it is important to afford 
protection to forest soils, fisheries, wildlife, water quantity and 
quality, air quality, recreation, and scenic beauty.121 
In 2001, the Washington’s Forest Practices Board formally adopted rules 
corresponding to the recommendations in the Forests and Fish Report.122 DNR, 
which administers and enforces the forest practices rules, incorporated the Forests 
and Fish Rules into the state’s administrative code.123 The new rules formed the 
basis for an HCP, completed in 2005, that covers specific forest management 
activities on nonfederal and nontribal lands that could affect any anadromous or 
freshwater native fish species or significantly impact amphibian species.124 In 
2006, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued to DNR an incidental take 
permit for sixteen listed salmon subspecies, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
issued an incidental take permit covering the threatened bull trout, forty other fish 
species, and seven amphibian species.125 Both permits are valid for fifty years. 
Consequently, when DNR issues a forest practices permit to a private forest 
manager, compliance with that permit also conveys the federal assurances of the 
incidental take permits. 
The Forests and Fish Report was a negotiated agreement that depended on 
compromise by the stakeholders, and it may have been impossible without the 
foundation laid by the Timber, Fish and Wildlife (TFW) Agreement. The TFW 
Agreement can be traced back to June 1986, when Billy Frank Jr., a leader of the 
Nisqually Tribe, approached Stewart Bledsoe, Executive Director of the 
Washington Forest Protection Association, with a proposal to negotiate new forest 
practices rules.126 Bledsoe agreed to give it a try. At that time the Washington 
Forest Practices Board was considering new regulations for riparian areas. The 
main stakeholders—treaty tribes, the timber industry, small forest landowners, and 
environmentalist organizations—were anxious about the outcome and dissatisfied 
 
 121. WASH. REV. CODE §76.09.010(1) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 122. The Forests and Fish Report led directly to state legislation in 1999, Engrossed Substitute H. B. 
2091, 56th Leg., 1999 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1999), which authorized the Washington Forest Practices 
Board to adopt the Forests and Fish Report as emergency rules. 
 123. See WASH. ADMIN CODE §§ 222-30-021 to -45 (2013) (codifying WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
FORESTS AND FISH REPORT (1999)); see also Wash. H. B. 2091. 
 124. At that time, seven amphibian species were thought to be significantly impacted by timber 
harvest and were covered by the HCP: Cascade, Columbia, and Olympic torrent salamanders 
(Rhyacotriton cascadae, kezeri, and olympicus), Dunn’s and Van Dyke’s salamanders (Plethodon dunni 
and vandykei), and coastal and Rocky Mountain tailed frogs (Ascaphus truei and montanus). 
 125. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Permit for Incidental Take of Endangered/Threatened Species, 
Permit no. 1573 (2006); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Federal Fish and Wildlife Permit, Permit no. 
TE121202-0 (2006). 
 126. Associated Press, Timber, Fish, Wildlife Pact Unprecedented, SPOKANE CHRON., Dec. 18, 
1987, at C5 (the article is also on file with author). 
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with the rule-making process.127 The timber industry was also concerned about 
Indian treaty rights pertaining to fish habitat.128 
In United States v. Washington (1974), Judge George Boldt found that 
treaties entitled Indians to a fair share of the fish resources at all their usual and 
accustomed places.129 In that same trial, the tribes claimed that the degradation of 
fish habitat had destroyed or impaired their fishing treaty rights. Boldt reserved 
resolution of that claim for a later trial, which became known as Boldt Phase II.130 
In the first trial of Phase II, United States v. Washington (1980),131 the U.S. District 
Court for Western Washington found an implicit right in the treaties to have fish 
habitats protected from “man-made despoliation.” However, in United States v. 
Washington (1985),132 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court 
ruling on the habitat degradation issue because sound judicial discretion indicated a 
decision should await a concrete case. How this treaty right should impact land 
uses, such as forestry, that are known to degrade fish habitats has yet to be 
determined in federal court.133 
In July 1986, a two and a half day meeting in Port Ludlow, Washington 
brought together over forty people representing twenty-four parties—various state 
agencies, numerous Indian tribes, the timber industry, and environmental 
organizations.134 Six months and some sixty meetings later the final TFW 
Agreement was completed.135 The TFW Agreement included recommendations 
that were translated to forest practices rules which were subsequently adopted by 
the Washington Forest Practices Board in September 1987. 
The historic TFW agreement led to the Forests and Fish Report because it 
established a cooperative process with ground rules for ongoing resolution of 
conflicts amongst the stakeholders. The TFW Agreement provided a framework “to 
meet the needs of a viable timber industry and at the same time provide protection 
 
 127. Duane E. Phinney et al., A New Approach to Riparian Management in Washington State, in 
PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO RIPARIAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 11, 12 (Robert E. Gresswell et al. 
eds., 1989). 
 128. Sarah Flynn & Thomas I. Gunton, Resolving Natural Resource Conflicts Through Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the Timber Fish Wildlife Agreement in Washington State, 23 
ENVIRONMENTS 101, 102 (1996). 
 129. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 332, 344 (W.D. Wash. 1974). 
 130. See id. at 348. See generally Martin H. Belsky, Indian Fishing Rights: A Lost Opportunity for 
Ecosystem Management, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (1996). 
 131. United States v. Washington. 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980). 
 132. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 133. But see United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986 (W.D. Wash. 2013) in which the 
plaintiffs, over twenty tribes in Washington State, filed a request for determination claiming that 
Washington State had violated their treaty rights through state-owned culverts that harm salmon 
populations. The court concluded that state-owned culverts had caused irreparable injury to the tribes’ 
treaty-based right of taking fish, and ordered Washington State to expeditiously replace or repair 
culverts which violate the treaties. For in-depth background and analysis of this case, see Michael C. 
Blumm & Jane G. Steadman, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and Habitat Protection: The Martinez 
Decision Supplies a Resounding Judicial Reaffirmation, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653, 653–706 (2009) 
 134. Phinney et al., supra note 127, at 12; Cynthia L. Halbert & Kai N. Lee, The Timber, Fish, and 
Wildlife Agreement: Implementing Alternative Dispute Resolution in Washington State, 6 NW. ENVTL. J. 
139, 141–42 (1990). 
 135. See Phinney et al., supra note 127, at 12; Halbert & Lee, supra note 134, at 141–42. 
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for our public resources: fish, wildlife, and water,” and the TFW participants 
“chose to resolve their differences through education, negotiation, and respect for 
each other’s views.”136 The TFW participants admitted that the agreement was “by 
its very nature a compromise or more accurately a series of intelligent 
accommodations of the various goals and needs.”137 Perhaps most importantly, the 
TFW agreement established an adaptive management program through which 
cooperative monitoring, evaluation, and research (CMER) provides information to 
policy makers for identifying and improving forest practices rules that have failed 
to achieve policy goals. 
In November 1996, policy makers within TFW and local officials of three 
federal agencies—USFWS, NMFS, and EPA—met to discuss the development of 
new forest practices regulations138 that would address a looming regulatory crisis—
the federal listing of anadromous salmon and bull trout as endangered or threatened 
species.139 In addition, “more than 300 stream segments on Washington forestlands 
were identified as non-compliant with Section 303(d) of the federal Clean Water 
Act.”140 The federal agencies agreed to a jointly developed “forestry module” that 
would rely upon the TFW process.141 A result much desired by the timber industry 
and state agencies was an HCP through which forest practices permits issued by 
DNR would also be compliant with the ESA for listed salmonids. Under Secretary 
Babbitt’s pro-HCP leadership, the Services were also hoping to strike such a deal. 
Furthermore, it was hoped that EPA would make similar assurances for the Clean 
Water Act. The federal agencies also required that the new rules not violate the 
federal trust responsibilities to Indian tribes. 
In May 1997, a new round of TFW negotiations commenced with the goal 
of agreeing upon new forest practices regulations that would achieve the four 
Forests and Fish goals (listed above). All TFW participants were motivated to 
make a deal. The tribes, environmentalist groups, and Washington Departments of 
Fish & Wildlife and Ecology believed that the forest practices rules did not provide 
enough protection for fish and water resources. Under the rules then in place, 
RMZs on fish-bearing streams could be twenty-five feet wide and no RMZs were 
required on non-fish-bearing streams. The timber industry and small non-industrial 
forest owners wanted economic viability and greater regulatory certainty. The 
 
 136. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., TIMBER/FISH/WILDLIFE AGREEMENT: A BETTER FUTURE IN OUR 
WOODS AND STREAMS 1 (1987). 
 137. Id. at 2. 
 138. Furman, supra note 120, at 13–14. 
 139. See Reeves et al., supra note 55, at 320–21. 
 140. Peter Nelson, Current Land-use Laws and Zoning: Impacts on Private Forestlands 4 (Nov. 
2005) (on file with the Univ. of Wash. Libraries), https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks
/bitstream/handle/1773/2238/tp8.pdf. 
 141. In 1997, shortly after the 1996 meeting, Governor Gary Locke formed a Joint Natural 
Resources Cabinet and charged it with creating a salmon recovery strategy for Washington State. The 
cabinet asked TFW to develop a “forestry module” which would contain recommendations for 
addressing impacts to listed salmonids and water quality attributed to forest management on nonfederal 
lands. Furman, supra note 120, at 13–15. Hence, the Forests and Fish Report became the “forestry 
module” of the Washington State Salmon Recovery Strategy. See WASH. JOINT NAT. RES. CABINET, 
GOVERNOR’S SALMON RECOVERY OFFICE, EXTINCTION IS NOT AN OPTION: STATEWIDE STRATEGY TO 
RECOVER SALMON (1999). The other modules in the strategy were agriculture and urban. 
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costly spotted owl wars were subsiding, but federal salmon listings were looming, 
and NMFS had indicated that the current forest practices rules posed an 
unacceptable risk of jeopardizing the continued existence of several salmon 
subspecies proposed for listing.142 The Forests and Fish Report was seen as the 
most practical way to avoid the costly disruptions of a potential “salmon war,” and 
to get ahead of rumors that NMFS might recommend FEMAT-like RMZs for 
nonfederal lands to protect endangered or threatened fish. Moreover, Boldt Phase II 
litigation for “man-made despoliation” of fish habitats was certainly a major 
concern. 
The Forests and Fish Report addressed five riparian ecosystem functions: 
bank stability, leaf litter fall and nutrients, sediment filtering, shade, and 
recruitment of LWD.143 The regulation of RMZs was intended to achieve a 
“desired future condition” (DFC) which was described as stand conditions of a 
mature riparian forest with a stand age equal to 140 years,144 and DFC was 
operationally defined as a stand’s basal area at age 140 years.145 Performance 
targets were established for each riparian function. The targets for stream shading 
and sediment delivery to streams were “virtually all available shade” and “virtually 
none,” respectively. The target for recruitment of LWD was “85% of recruitment 
potential for a stand on the trajectory toward DFC conditions; additional 
recruitment from trees in the outer zone”.146 
The new rules required RMZ widths on all fish-bearing streams equal to 
the site-potential height of a 100-year old tree.147 Depending on site class, the RMZ 
width could range from 90 to 200 ft.148 The RMZ in western Washington consisted 
of three subzones: a 50 ft. wide, no-harvest, core zone adjacent to the stream 
channel; an inner zone 10 to 100 ft. wide, depending on site class and stream width, 
where allowable timber harvest was based on the residual basal area needed to 
meet DFC but residual tree density could not be less than either twenty or fifty-
seven trees/acre, depending on their spatial arrangement; and an outer zone where 
harvest must leave at least twenty trees/acre.149 The subzone widths were based, in 
 
 142. Letter from William Steele, NMFS Regional Administrator, to Anne Badgley, USFWS 
Regional Director (Sept. 16, 1998) (letter on file with author) (regarding biological assessment for 
northern spotted owl 4(d) rule). 
 143. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FINAL FOREST PRACTICES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 182 
(2005). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 190. 
 146. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 119, at 159. 
 147. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 143, at 233–34. 
 148. Id. at 190 tbl.4.5. The DNR state trust lands HCP and the Forests and Fish HCP both used the 
100-year site-potential tree height for riparian buffer/RMZ widths. However, site-potential tree heights 
for the trust land HCP range from 86 to 215 ft. and site-potential tree heights for the Forests and Fish 
HCP range from 90 to 200 ft. The difference is due to the sources for site index curves. For a discussion 
of the curves used by the trust land HCP, see JAMES E. KING, FORESTRY RESEARCH CTR., SITE INDEX 
CURVES FOR DOUGLAS-FIR IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1966). Forests and Fish used curves by 
MCARDLE ET AL., supra note 64, at 13. The trust land HCP set the minimum buffer width at 100 ft., and 
therefore, on fish-bearing streams, the Forests and Fish RMZ for western Washington is roughly 4-10% 
narrower than riparian buffers of the state trust land HCP. 
 149. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 143, at 188–94. Because of differences in forest 
types between western and eastern Washington, there were differences in the Forests and Fish Rules 
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part, on a tree’s effective height, which refers to the portion of a tree’s bole that 
contributes LWD.150 The effective height concept facilitated compromise on 
subzone widths because it provided a scientific reason for narrower widths.151 
On perennial non-fish-bearing streams, the RMZ is a fifty-foot-wide no-
harvest zone over fifty percent of the stream’s length, and at sensitive sites, such as 
stream confluences, a circular buffer with radius of fifty-six feet is required. Along 
seasonal, non-fish-bearing streams, all timber may be harvested, but a thirty foot 
wide equipment limitation zone is required.152 
The Forests and Fish Report recommended more structure to TFW’s 
adaptive management program. “To impose accountability and formality of 
process”, the report gave explicit directions to the CMER committee about how to 
conduct its business, and the report was also very clear that “scientists will assist 
policy makers with technical questions but will not make policy.” In addition, the 
report recommended a full-time Adaptive Management Program Administrator and 
an independent Scientific Review Committee. Lastly, it described a process for 
“closing the loop,” i.e., using scientific research to improve the forest practices 
rules, and a process for dispute resolution “if the loop fails to close.”153 Perhaps 
most importantly, the report recommended substantial, stable, long-term funding of 
the adaptive management program. Between 2001 and 2015, state funding for the 
program averaged about $4.2 million per year, and between 2001 and 2011, federal 
funding averaged $2.2 million per year.154 
One of the first uncertainties to be addressed by CMER was the basal area 
targets for DFC. The basal area targets for the original Forests and Fish Rules were 
based on yield tables in a forty-year old technical bulletin for fully-stocked, upland 
stands.155 The resulting basal areas varied by site class and ranged from 285 to 190 
ft/ac2 for sites classes 1 through 5, respectively.156 A study sponsored by the CMER 
committee measured the characteristics of 112 unmanaged (i.e., natural), mature, 
riparian forest stands on site classes 2 through 5.157 It found that the live conifer 
 
between western and eastern Washington. For simplicity, we describe only the rules for western 
Washington. 
 150. See STEPHEN E. FAIRWEATHER ET AL., WESTSIDE RMZS AND THE DFC MODEL: 
DOCUMENTATION OF THEIR CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 6 (2001). By 
definition, large wood has a minimum diameter of four inches, and therefore, only that portion of a 
tree’s bole greater than four inches in diameter is large wood. The effective height is roughly three to 
fifteen percent shorter than a tree’s total height, depending on site class and tree species. 
 151. Id. 
 152. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 143, at 194–96. 
 153. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FOREST PRACTICES BOARD MANUAL § 22, at M22-6 (2013). 
 154. See WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FINAL REPORT: 2000-2011 FORESTS AND FISH AGREEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION FUNDING BY THE PACIFIC COASTAL SALMON RECOVERY FUND 21–24 (2011), 
https://www.rco.wa.gov/documents/salmon/BoardMaterials/agendas/2011/12/S1211_8.pdf; spreadsheet 
from Dawn Hitchens, Business Administrator, Wash. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Forest Practices Div., to 
George F. Wilhere (Jan. 4, 2016) (on file with author). 
 155. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 150, at 11–14. 
 156. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 119, at 95. 
 157. DAVID SCHUETT-HAMES ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE WESTERN WASHINGTON RIPARIAN 
DESIRED FUTURE CONDITION PERFORMANCE TARGETS IN THE WASHINGTON STATE FOREST PRACTICES 
RULES WITH DATA FROM MATURE, UNMANAGED, CONIFER-DOMINATED RIPARIAN STANDS 12 tbl.6 
(2005), http://file.dnr.wa.gov/publications/fp_cmer_05_507.pdf.. 
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basal area in riparian areas was significantly greater than the original DFC 
estimates and that there were no significant differences in basal area among site 
classes. The ultimate outcome of that study was a revised DFC target equal to 325 
ft/ac2 for all site classes. 
The Forests and Fish Report was the result of negotiation and compromise 
achieved through a mix of science, stakeholder values, and politics. The two most 
obvious compromises are the description of DFC and the width of the RMZ. A 
stand age of 140 years was agreed to because it is halfway between 80 years, the 
youngest age of a mature forest,158 and 200 years, the youngest age of an old-
growth forest.159 Old-growth forest was considered the ideal future condition by 
some stakeholders, and mature forest was thought to be a suitable future condition 
by other stakeholders. A negotiated compromise landed all stakeholders exactly in 
the middle. 
Like DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands, the site-potential height as 
defined by the Forests and Fish Report is less than the full potential height. The 
RMZ width was based on the 100-year site-potential tree height, but Douglas-fir, 
the most common tree species in managed forests of western Washington, may not 
achieve full height until 300 years or older.160 The site-potential height of a 100 
year old Douglas fir is about 78% that of a 300 year old Douglas fir.161 In theory 
and empirically, full riparian function for LWD recruitment requires a no-harvest 
RMZ with width equal to or greater than the full effective potential height of trees 
in the riparian area.162 The performance target for LWD recruitment, i.e., “85% of 
recruitment potential” implicitly acknowledges the report’s compromise on RMZ 
width. 
The Forests and Fish Report was controversial. Three state agencies, three 
federal agencies, nearly all treaty tribes in Washington, the timber industry, and 
small non-industrial forest owners reached agreement about the report, but all 
environmentalist groups and three tribes were dissatisfied with it and withdrew 
from the negotiation process. These same environmentalist groups and tribes also 
testified before the House Committee on Natural Resources opposing legislation 
that would enable DNR to quickly implement the Forests and Fish Report.163 
Despite this opposition, the state legislature and Governor Gary Locke passed the 
new rules as part of the Forest Practices and Salmon Recovery Act of 1999.164 
NMFS and USFWS found that the Forests and Fish HCP satisfied the five criteria 
of the ESA’s Section 10(a)(2)(B),165 approved the HCP, and issued to DNR fifty-
 
 158. See Thomas A. Spies & Jerry F. Franklin, The Structure of Natural Young, Mature, and Old-
Growth Douglas-fir Forests in Oregon and Washington, in WILDLIFE AND VEGETATION OF 
UNMANAGED DOUGLAS-FIR FORESTS, supra note 44, at 91, 92 
 159. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 150, at 11. 
 160. See MCARDLE ET AL., supra note 64, at 13 fig.2. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See McDade et al., supra note 107. 
 163. H. B. Rep. ESHB 2091, at 12–13 (Wash. 1999), http://app.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/1999
-00/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/2091.HBR.pdf. 
 164. See supra note 122. 
 165. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION 
BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND SECTION 10 STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY 
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year incidental take permits.166 EPA and the Washington State Department of 
Ecology, which administers the federal Clean Water Act in Washington, also gave 
regulatory assurances to DNR and the timber industry.167 
D. Case Study Summary 
The case studies describe three monumental conservation plans for fish 
and riparian-dependent species that cover 12.3 million acres of federal, state, and 
private managed forests in Washington State. All three plans protect and/or restore 
to varying degrees the same five riparian ecosystem functions: stream bank 
integrity, detrital nutrients, sediment filtration, shade, and recruitment of LWD. 
All three plans were developed for the same habitats and species in the 
same region over a span of roughly seven years, during which there were no major 
advances in the science of riparian ecosystems, thus all drew from the same body 
of science. DNR’s HCP for state forest lands and the Forests and Fish HCP, for 
example, both cite FEMAT to justify how they protect stream bank integrity.168 
DNR’s HCP for state forest lands also cites FEMAT to justify how it protects the 
detrital nutrient function.169 The Forests and Fish HCP included the FEMAT curves 
(Figure 1) as part the plan’s rationale.170 As the FEMAT curves suggest, to achieve 
full function for all five functions, the minimum width of a riparian buffer must 
extend to the ends of the shade and LWD recruitment curves. For all three plans, 
the most influential information on shade was Beschta et al.,171 and for all three 
plans the most influential information on LWD debris recruitment was McDade et 
al.172 The McDade et al. study was arguably the most influential study in 
determining the minimum riparian reserve, riparian buffer, and RMZ widths 
(henceforth, collectively referred to as riparian buffers). At that time is was the 
only field research conducted in western Washington and Oregon, which has 
forests very similar to those in Washington, on LWD recruitment in old-growth and 
natural, mature riparian forests. Furthermore, the differences in buffer width cannot 
be attributed to misuse of the available science. Using the McDade et al. study, the 
two HCPs honestly described the reduction in LWD expected to result from their 
 
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT CONSULTATION: WASHINGTON 
STATE FOREST PRACTICES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 289–93 (2006), https://www.dnr.wa.gov
/publications/fp_hcp_nmfs_bo_findings.pdf. 
 166. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 125; U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., supra 
note 125. 
 167. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 119, at 167–73. 
 168. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.73 to IV.74; WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
supra note 143, at 243. 
 169. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.74. 
 170. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 143, at 229–30. 
 171. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 46, at V-28 (citing Robert L 
Beschta et al., Stream Temperature and Aquatic Habitat: Fisheries and Forestry Interactions, in 
STREAMSIDE MANAGEMENT: FORESTRY AND FISHERY INTERACTIONS 191 (Ernest O. Salo & Terrance 
W. Cundy eds., 1987)); WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.74 (same); WASH. DEP’T OF 
NAT. RES., supra note 143, at 239-40 (same). 
 172. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 46, at V-26 (citing McDade et 
al., supra note 107); WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at IV.71 (same); WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. 
RES., supra note 143, at 231 (same). 
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buffer widths along fish-bearing streams. DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands 
estimated that its RMZ would provide ninety percent of the natural level of in-
stream LWD. The Forests and Fish HCP’s target for LWD is eighty-five percent of 
recruitment potential for a stand on the trajectory toward DFC conditions. In both 
HCPs, science was used as it should be—to inform the policy making process on 
the potential impacts, outcomes, and trade-offs of proposed policy. In short, 
differences amongst the three plans in riparian buffer widths and buffer 
management on fish-bearing streams cannot be attributed to differences in, or 
misuse of, the available science. 
When the three plans were developed, there was very little scientific 
information regarding impacts to downstream fish habitats from forest management 
along non-fish-bearing streams. The resulting uncertainty is reflected in FEMAT’s 
three scenarios for non-fish-bearing streams which had buffer widths ranging from 
75 to 150 ft. The two HCPs addressed the uncertainty associated with non-fish-
bearing streams in different ways. DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands promised a 
low-risk (for fish) 100-ft. buffer on streams wider than 2 ft. For narrower streams a 
research program was promised, but it has been rather modest and has produced 
little new knowledge. The Forests and Fish HCP promised a buffer with an average 
width of roughly twenty-five feet. However, this higher risk (for fish) approach was 
accompanied by a $10 million research program that will soon produce a 1,000-
page report.173 The conclusions of that report will be presented to policy makers 
whose deliberations will eventually lead to a decision on new forest practices rules 
for non-fish-bearing streams. Both HCPs embody rational approaches to risk. 174 
Low-risk management lessens the demand for new scientific information because 
research is unlikely to detect significant harm to public resources that requires 
changes to management. While this approach is costlier because it reduces 
commodity production, it provides greater regulatory certainty for the landowner. 
High-risk management provokes an urgency for new scientific information because 
research is needed to determine: 1) the actual impacts of current management; and 
2) if impacts are unacceptable, how to improve management. While this approach 
could result in regulatory disruptions, it is less likely to impose unnecessary 
regulations on private lands. Policy makers and stakeholders involved in the HCPs 
were aware of these trade-offs and deemed them acceptable. 
From a policy and planning perspective, the plans collectively offer some 
useful insights. First, all of the plans were motivated by a crisis or impending crisis. 
In all three cases, the crisis was created by a violation or potential violation of 
federal laws that could halt or significantly disrupt commercial timber harvest. In 
all three cases, the ultimate response to the crisis was a two to three year intensely 
focused effort that produced a multi-species conservation plan which complied 
with federal laws and enabled commercial timber harvest. The two HCPs were 
affected by a secondary crisis—legislative threats to the ESA. The historical lesson 
may be that crisis creates an opportunity for policy makers and stakeholders to find 
 
 173. Interview with Marc Hayes, Senior Research Scientist, Wash. Dept. Fish & Wildlife, in 
Olympia, Wash. (Feb. 15, 2017). 
 174. See Edward T. Game et al., Subjective Risk Assessment for Planning Conservation Projects, 8 
ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 1, 9 (2013). 
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the politically acceptable balance between habitat conservation and commodity 
production. 
Second, each plan was the result of visionary and determined leadership. 
President Clinton’s Northwest Forest Conference was unprecedented. Not since 
Theodore Roosevelt had a President of the United States been so closely involved 
in forest management issues.175 In fact, the NWFP was originally referred to as the 
President’s Forest Plan.176 Secretary Babbitt recognized that the way to preserve 
the ESA was through aggressive promotion of Section 10(a)(1)(B), and his strategy 
yielded a twenty-fold increase in the number of approved HCPs. Commissioner 
Belcher changed the entrenched culture of a government bureaucracy.177 Before 
Belcher, endangered and threatened species were thought of as extra burdens that 
interfered with DNR’s primary mission; after Belcher, fish and wildlife habitats 
became required outcomes of forest management. TFW—a collaborative, 
stakeholder-driven process for developing forest practices rules—led to the Forests 
and Fish Report and may have been impossible without the leadership of Billy 
Frank Jr. and Stewart Bledsoe. 
Third, the goals of each plan were largely based on existing statutes, 
regulations, common law, and treaties. The NWFP had to comply with the ESA 
and NFMA’s viability standard while trying to attain the “high-level” timber 
harvest encouraged by the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act. DNR’S HCP for 
forested trust lands had to comply with the ESA while fulfilling the obligations of a 
trustee. The Forests and Fish HCP had to comply with the ESA and the Clean 
Water Act, avoid potential litigation under Boldt Phase II, and satisfy the economic 
viability declaration of Washington’s Forest Practices Act. 
Fourth, conflicts amongst societal values forced an examination of trade-
offs by policy makers and/or stakeholders. The ESA, NFMA’s viability standard, 
and the Clean Water Act express society’s desire for environmental protection but 
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, DNR’s trust mandate, and Washington’s 
Forest Practices Act express society’s desire for economic gain from timber 
harvest. All three plans were forced to balance conflicting ecological and economic 
values, however, because the plans operated within different legal frameworks, the 
proper balance, as expressed through buffer widths and timber harvest within 
buffers, was different for each plan. 
Fifth, each plan promised adaptive management. Adaptive management 
can be defined as the systematic acquisition and application of reliable information 
to improve management over time.178 Adaptive management is often invoked in 
conservation plans as the way to deal with uncertainties and for improving a plan as 
 
 175. See generally GERALD W. WILLIAMS, THE USDA FOREST SERVICE−THE FIRST CENTURY 
(2005). 
 176. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE FOREST PLAN: FOR A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY AND 
A SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT (1993). The NWFP was originally titled “The Forest Plan for a 
Sustainable Economy and a Sustainable Environment.” The only names on the front cover of the plan’s 
formal announcement were President William J. Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore Jr. That 
document refers to the plan as “the President’s Plan.” 
 177. See Belcher, supra note 86. 
 178. George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 20, 21 (2002). 
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we learn more through monitoring and research. In the three case studies, adaptive 
management also provided a mechanism for resolving an impasse in the courts or 
in negotiations. The expectation of “faithfully carried out” adaptive management 
was part of Judge Dwyer’s reasoning for approving the NWFP. The Services 
approved DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands because the HCP includes 
contractual obligations for research, monitoring, and adaptive management that 
should over time resolve various uncertainties that arose during HCP 
negotiations.179 The negotiations that led to the Forests and Fish Report were 
successful because they established a rigorous adaptive management process that 
all participants believed would lead to continual improvement of the Forests and 
Fish HCP. The revision of DFC basal area targets validated their belief. In effect, 
adaptive management allowed conflicting stakeholders in TFW to reach an 
agreement with the understanding that over time information generated by CMER 
would resolve unsettled disputes about necessary and sufficient forest practices 
regulations. 
There were at least two important differences among the three plans. The 
first is the processes used to develop them. The NWFP and DNR’s HCP for 
forested trust lands were top-down processes developed by government agency 
staff behind closed doors. Stakeholder involvement in the NWFP occurred through 
the federal courts, and environmentalist groups were very effective at altering 
forest management on federal lands through numerous lawsuits.180 Stakeholder 
involvement in DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands was limited to public review 
and comment required by NEPA and SEPA. The NEPA/SEPA process resulted in 
no substantive changes to the riparian conservation strategy of DNR’s HCP for 
state trust lands. In contrast, the Forests and Fish Report was a bottom-up process. 
That is, the process was driven by the stakeholders who worked cooperatively. A 
government agency, DNR, facilitated the TFW process, but the final report was an 
agreement amongst the participating stakeholders and government agencies. 
The second and more obvious differences among the three plans are the 
widths of riparian buffers (Table 1).181 The NWFP was the most protective and the 
Forests and Fish HCP was the least. On fish-bearing streams, the riparian reserve 
width of the NWFP is roughly 2.2 times wider than the RMZ of DNR’s HCP for 
forested trust land and 2.4 times wider than the RMZ of the Forests and Fish HCP. 
 
 179. WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 85, at B.1 to B.19. 
 180. See generally Brendon Swedlow, Scientists, Judges, and Spotted Owls: Policy Makers in the 
Pacific Northwest, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 187–278 (2003). 
 181. There are two other differences affecting the widths of riparian reserves or RMZs. The first, 
which has a minor effect, is how the distance is measured. The NWFP measured width along the slope 
of the riparian area while the DNR state lands and Forests and Fish HCPs measured horizontal distance. 
For a slope of thirty percent (seventeen degrees), using the horizontal distance to measure a 100 ft. wide 
RMZ results in a slope distance of 104 ft. Therefore, the HCPs’ measurement of width results in a 
slightly wider RMZ. The second difference, which could have a major effect, is where the measurement 
starts. The NWFP begins the measurement of riparian reserve width at the edge of the active channel. 
The DNR state lands HCP begins measurement at the outer margin of the 100-year floodplain. The 
Forests and Fish HCP begins at the edge of the channel migration zone (CMZ). On narrow, confined 
streams there may be very little difference amongst the active channel, 100-year floodplain, and CMZ. 
On wide, unconfined streams the active channel could be much narrower than the 100-year floodplain 
and CMZ. 
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On non-fish-bearing perennial streams, the riparian reserve width of the NWFP is 
approximately 1.8 times wider than the riparian buffer of DNR’s HCP for forested 
trust land and 7.2 times wider than the RMZ of the Forests and Fish HCP. 
Furthermore, the amount of timber harvest allowed is quite different. Effectively no 
harvest is allowed within riparian reserves of the NWFP;182 from ten to forty-five 
percent of timber volume could be harvested from the RMZ of DNR’s HCP, with 
most harvest occurring in the wind buffer; and roughly thirty to sixty percent of 
trees could be harvested from the RMZ of the Forests and Fish HCP, with most 
harvest occurring in the outer zone.183 We contend that these differences are the 
legitimate result of different legal frameworks and the different values of the 
people who led or negotiated each plan. 
IV. THE ROLE OF VALUES IN RIPARIAN AREA CONSERVATION 
The three conservation plans were developed over a short period of time 
from 1992 to 1999, and consequently, the science on aquatic and riparian 
ecosystems available to each of the plans was nearly the same. All three plans 
claim to use best available science, and yet the buffer widths are different. Why? 
An op-ed article in the Seattle Times by two prominent scientists at the 
University of Washington, Jim Karr and David Montgomery, reframes the 
question. They noted that, “no-cut zones around rivers and streams under the state 
[Forests and Fish] HCP are narrower and less extensive than zones required under 
federal logging rules [i.e., NWFP],” and asked, “[d]oes the best available science 
really change at property boundaries?”184 The answer is that the science does not 
change, but the legal framework does. The NWFP, DNR’s HCP for forested trust 
lands, and the Forests and Fish HCP were subject to different statutes, regulations, 
and common law. 
However imperfectly, laws express society’s values.185 The ESA, for 
example, declares “species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation”186 and 
sections of the Act prohibiting take of endangered or threatened species express 
society’s desire to perpetuate all wild species. The goal of the Clean Water Act—
”to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters”187—implies society’s belief in the importance of clean water. On 
the other hand, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act expresses society’s desire for 
a predictable, sustainable timber supply from national forests, and the 
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Washington’s Forest Practices Act expresses society’s desire for a viable forest 
products industry. In Washington State, statutes and regulations governing forest 
management were different for federal, state, and private lands, and consequently, 
the conservation plans for aquatic and riparian habitats were different too. 
The large difference between the riparian buffer widths of the NWFP and 
the two HCPs can mostly be attributed to the different requirements of NFMA’s 
viability standard and the ESA’s Section 10. “Viable populations” of all native 
vertebrate species in the planning area is a much higher standard than “not 
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery” of only those 
species covered by an HCP. For species listed as endangered or threatened under 
the ESA, the viability standard may require extensive habitat restoration, but 
Section 10 may allow some habitat destruction. That is, an HCP enables habitat 
destruction that reduces the likelihood of survival and recovery but not 
appreciably.188 Nevertheless, both HCPs will increase the likelihood of survival 
and recovery of listed salmonids because both provide substantially more riparian 
habitat protection than the forest practices rules that existed prior to the HCPs. In 
comments submitted through the SEPA/NEPA process for DNR’s forested trust 
land HCP, two environmentalist groups recommended that the riparian reserve 
widths of the NWFP be the minimum standards for DNR’s HCP.189 This request 
failed to recognize: 1) the dramatically different requirements of the federal laws 
that governed the two plans; and 2) that other values, expressed through law, 
limited the width of the HCP’s riparian buffer. 
Values affected riparian buffer widths in less obvious ways as well. 
DNR’s forested trust land HCP had a more ambitious conservation goal than the 
Forests and Fish HCP. The former wanted an incidental take permit covering all 
animal species; the latter’s goal was an incidental take permit for all fish and seven 
amphibian species. The number of species to include in an HCP is a normative 
decision that weighs the cost of additional habitat conservation versus the risk of 
potential encumbrances due to future listings of endangered species.190 Another 
reason DNR’s forested trust land HCP buffers are wider than those of the Forests 
and Fish HCP may be the difference between DNR’s trust mandate and a 
corporation’s fiduciary duty toward shareholders. The former compels risk-averse 
prudence for preservation of the trust estate, which enables the judgment that lower 
rates of financial return are an acceptable trade-off for greater security. The latter 
entails maximizing shareholder income, and therefore, a “viable forest products 
industry” may require much higher rates of financial return. 
A major avenue through which values enter policy making is through 
vague or ambiguous language in statutes or regulations. The NFMA’s viability 
standard, the ESA’s Sections 7 and 10, and the declarations of the Washington 
Forest Practices Act all contain unclear language open to subjective interpretation. 
Even the common law obligations of a trustee, e.g., “ordinary prudence,” are 
somewhat vague. The interpretation of unclear statutory language is influenced by 
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 190. See Wilhere, supra note 189, at 1090–92. 
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normative values,191 and therefore, policy makers’ values affected each plan, 
perhaps unconsciously, through their personal interpretations of unclear language. 
The NMFA’s viability standard, for instance, states, “habitat shall be 
managed to maintain viable populations”, but “viable” has no generally agreed 
upon scientific definition and it is not defined in federal regulations or formal 
policies. A viability threshold (or minimum survival probability) is an expression 
of acceptable extinction risk; acceptable risk is ultimately based on values 
(although it should also be informed by facts), and therefore, it is a policy 
decision.192 Policymakers at the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior 
apparently delegated this policy decision to scientists. Scientists on FEMAT 
defined “viable” as an eighty percent likelihood of a stable, well-distributed 
population over 100 years. Eighty percent was a curious choice because the vast 
majority of scientific papers use viability thresholds of ninety percent or greater.193 
This percentage reflects the FEMAT scientists’ interpretation of President 
Clinton’s values as expressed through his five principles for the NWFP. The 
scientists’ judgment regarding acceptable extinction risk may be very different than 
that of society in general. Environmentalist groups, for example, described the 
eighty percent threshold as “unduly risky” in federal court.194 
Had a different threshold been chosen by the scientists, then the amount of 
habitat protected by the NWFP may have been very different. An economic 
analysis by Montgomery et al.195 illustrates the potential consequences of selecting 
a higher viability threshold for the northern spotted owl. They estimated that the 
reduction in timber sales revenue for an eighty-two percent viability threshold was 
$21 billion per year and the reduction for a ninety-five percent viability threshold 
was $46 billion per year in 1990 dollars—more than twice the cost (equivalent to 
$41.8 and $89.4 billion, respectively in 2018). In theory, a similar type of trade-off 
analysis could be done for salmonids. 
The economic analysis of Montgomery et al. was not available when 
Alternative 9 was chosen, however, the Secretaries were well aware of the trade-
offs and the substantially greater cost of a more environmentally protective 
alternative. They chose the alternative that complied with federal law and was 
consistent with President Clinton’s five principles. Selection of an alternative did 
not simply “follow the science,” nor could it. Normative influences such as 
political philosophy, concerns for citizens’ social welfare (i.e., maintaining timber 
industry jobs), and environmental ethics were undoubtedly integral to that decision. 
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Section 10(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the ESA contains the vague phrase “not 
appreciably reduce.”196 How the Services interpreted “appreciably” and what they 
conveyed about that interpretation to policy makers at state agencies responsible 
for DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands and for the Forests and Fish HCP certainly 
affected the amount of habitat conservation provided by those plans. The 
Washington Forest Practices Act contains the vague phrase “viable forest products 
industry.”197 Because this phrase constrained the economic burden that could be 
imposed on the timber industry, how policy makers and stakeholders interpreted 
“viable” was critical to negotiations that led to the Forests and Fish Report. Policy 
makers could reasonably assume that the timber industry would never agree to a 
Forests and Fish Report that threatened its viability. However, during the Forests 
and Fish negotiations, stakeholders desiring more habitat protection were at a 
disadvantage. They did not know the upper limit of habitat protection that would 
actually threaten the industry’s viability, and the vague meaning of “viability” may 
have compounded their uncertainty. The Forests and Fish Report and related 
documents198 do not define or discuss the meaning of “viable,” so the effect of the 
law’s vagueness is unknown. 
The unique constraints imposed by each plan’s legal framework did not 
dictate the policy outcome. Statutes, regulations, and common law only establish 
boundaries of a policy decision space, i.e., they limit the set of allowable solutions. 
Negotiations amongst adversarial stakeholders with different cultural values may 
find a mutually acceptable solution within the decision space. Frank and Bledsoe 
implicitly understood that concept. They foresaw that a collaborative stakeholder-
driven process could result in better outcomes for all sides. Visionary leadership 
can push government agencies or stakeholders to expand the frontiers of the 
decision space. Commissioner Belcher, for instance, envisioned what the previous 
commissioner could not—an HCP for spotted owls, marbled murrelets, salmon, 
and many other species covering 1.6 million acres. Secretary Babbitt’s strategy for 
HCPs expanded the set of allowable solutions for private landowners affected by 
endangered or threatened species. 
Navigation within the decision space is influenced by the values held by 
political leaders and stakeholder groups. Clinton and Belcher professed strong pro-
environmental values that held sway over their plans’ development. Consequently, 
regions of the decision space that afforded low levels of habitat protection were 
implicitly off limits. Moreover, both politicians tested the boundaries of the 
decision space by approving substantial leaps in habitat protection. In contrast, the 
Forests and Fish Report was developed through a multi-stakeholder process, and 
while it too made a substantial leap in habitat protection for private forest lands, 
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statutory constraints (i.e., a smaller decision space) and compromises amongst 
stakeholders resulted in less habitat protection than the other two plans. 
Navigating the policy decision space entails weighing trade-offs and 
making compromises. Science is essential for understanding the potential costs and 
benefits—ecological, economic, and social—associated with various trade-offs. 
Both HCPs considered LWD recruitment to be the most important riparian 
ecosystem function for determining riparian buffer widths. This was based on the 
scientific understanding at that time, and that happens to still hold true. Using 
empirical relationships in McDade et al.199 both HCPs were able to determine the 
approximate amount of LWD that would be recruited with different buffer widths 
relative to old-growth or natural, mature riparian forests. Knowing how much 
LWD buffers would provide for salmonid habitats was important information for 
policy makers on both sides of HCP negotiations. In the DNR state lands HCP, for 
instance, DNR and the Services came to understand that narrower buffers would be 
too risky for endangered or threatened salmonids, but wider buffers would be too 
costly to the trust beneficiaries. Scientific analysis enabled both sides to understand 
that their compromises, which were necessary to reach agreement, complied with 
the law, i.e., lay within the decision space of allowable solutions. Science played a 
similar role in the negotiations that led to the Forests and Fish Report. 
Differences amongst the plans may also be due to differences in how top-
down and bottom-up processes navigate a decision space. In typical top-down 
policy making (e.g., NWFP), a government agency initially focuses on a limited set 
of alternative policies from which to select a preferred policy. The preferred policy 
reflects the values of the agency’s leaders, the science which informed their 
decision, and the constraints imposed by the decision space. Stakeholders who 
believe their interests were poorly served by the agency’s final policy may contest 
the validity of the top-down policy through the courts. In contrast, bottom-up 
policy making (e.g., Forests and Fish Report) starts with a diverse set of policies 
representing the values or interests of all stakeholders. Initially, the preferred 
policies of some stakeholders may be entirely unacceptable to other stakeholders, 
or some proposed policies may lie outside the decision space. Through multiple 
compromises, stakeholders work their way around the decision space and 
eventually converge on a mutually acceptable policy. Throughout the process, 
compromises are informed by science. If all major stakeholders are included in a 
bottom-up process, then the final policy’s validity is unlikely to be challenged in 
court. 
Interpretation of unclear statutory or regulatory language by policy makers 
or stakeholders also effects the boundaries of the policy decision space. When 
scientists on FEMAT chose an eighty percent viability threshold, rather than a 
more conventional ninety percent or greater threshold, the decision space for policy 
makers was expanded. Likewise, how policy makers interpreted “viable forest 
products industry” may have altered the set of allowable solutions for the Forests 
and Fish Report. For those who believe the Forests and Fish Report was a success, 
statutory vagueness provided the flexibility needed to reach a long-term agreement 
and settle an environmental conflict. For those who believe it was a failure, 
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statutory vagueness enabled the Forests and Fish Report to subvert the intentions of 
the state legislature and U.S. Congress. 
Differences amongst the plans may also be related to ownership because 
land ownership influences public attitudes towards forest management.200 For 
example, two separate random telephone surveys in the southeastern United States 
found that wood production was considered less important for public forests than 
for private forests,201 and that fifty percent of respondents believed clearcutting 
should be allowed on private land while only fourteen percent believed it should be 
allowed on public land.202 The differences in public opinion regarding forest 
management on public versus private lands may be explained by the protective 
“ownership” that many citizens feel for public lands and an inclination to respect 
the property rights of private landowners. Furthermore, attitudes toward public land 
management exhibit national versus regional dichotomies. A national poll, taken 
near the zenith of the spotted owl wars, found that seventy-six percent of 
respondents believed remaining old-growth forest on federal lands should be 
protected, but a poll of Oregon citizens found fifty-one percent held that belief.203 
The difference in responses may be explained by local concerns about regional 
timber-based economies. These surveys report the general public’s attitudes, which 
arise from personal values and beliefs.204 Stakeholder representatives and 
government officials may possess attitudes similar to the general public. Perhaps 
differences in the amount of habitat protection provided by DNR’s HCP for state 
trust lands and the Forests and Fish HCP were based, in part, on attitudes regarding 
the management of public and private forests. Likewise, differences in the amount 
of habitat protection provided by DNR’s HCP for forested trust lands and the 
NWFP may have been based, in part, on attitudes regarding the management of 
state forests, which have significant, direct impacts on funding for local schools, 
and attitudes on the management of federal forests, which have diffuse, 
inconsequential impacts on a nationwide constituency. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this article was to further clarify the relationships 
among science, values, and law in environmental policy making. Our vehicles for 
fulfilling that purpose are three conservation plans for federal, state, and private 
managed forest lands in Washington State. All three plans attempted to answer the 
question “how wide is wide enough?” for riparian buffers on rivers and streams for 
the protection of freshwater salmonid habitats. 
The answer to the question “how wide is wide enough?” is “it depends.” 
The answer depends on our current scientific understanding, but it also depends on 
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existing law and societal values. As the case studies demonstrate, past decisions on 
salmonid habitat conservation have not been based on science alone. Science is 
essential for developing environmental policy, but the foundation of policy is 
normative values, including ecological, economic, and social values. Science may 
profoundly influence societal values, but science should not be allowed to displace 
the preeminent role of values in making environmental policy.205 
Policy makers must consider both science and values when deciding 
which environmental policies will create a world that is consistent with our values. 
The phrase “follow the science” should be replaced with “follow our values and be 
informed by science.” The values to be followed are those expressed through law, 
and, within the confines of existing law, the cultural values held by various 
stakeholder groups. When laws and cultural values conflict, political processes are 
absolutely necessary to reach agreement amongst stakeholders. 
The answer to “how much is enough?” depends on the process used to 
find it. Top-down (e.g., NWFP) and bottom-up (e.g., Forests and Fish HCP) 
processes are likely to yield different answers. The answer also depends on 
political leadership. Remove Clinton, Belcher, Frank or Bledsoe from the process 
and answer to “how much is enough” is likely to be very different. The processes 
they initiated (Northwest Forest Conference, TFW) and/or led resulted in bold 
conservation plans that reflected their values. The answer also depends on how 
much uncertainty can be tolerated. Adaptive management addresses uncertainty by 
starting with provisional answers that will be revised over time in response to new 
scientific knowledge. Without adaptive management, not only will the answers be 
different, but lawful, politically feasible answers may be impossible. 
The importance of adaptive management cannot be overstated. Adaptive 
management allowed all three plans to move forward despite uncertainties and 
disagreements. Government agencies, tribes, and stakeholders knew that habitat 
conditions resulting from the conservation plans were difficult to predict. 
Consequently, key parties to both HCPs recognized that parts of the negotiated 
agreement might not be permanent, and that a process should be instituted to enable 
changes as new information became available. In fact, negotiations for both HCPs 
included identification of the greatest uncertainties, which led to priorities for 
research and monitoring. The Forests and Fish HCP is an especially good model for 
adaptive management because it implements a rigorous, highly-structured process 
for managing a well-funded research program and uses the results of that research 
to improve environmental policy over time. Specifically, we believe a collaborative 
process facilitated by a state or local government agency within an adaptive 
management framework, like that created by the Forests and Fish Report, is the 
most likely avenue to achieving rationale, equitable, and durable plans for habitat 
conservation that appropriately integrate science and values. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the Three Major Riparian Conservation Strategies in 
Washington State. Buffer Widths are Applied to Both Sides of Stream. 
* The Forest and Fish Report was finished in 1999. The forest practices regulations pursuant to the 
Forests and Fish Report were approved by the Washington Forest Practices Board in 2001. The habitat 
conservation plan was approved in 2006. 
‡ Abbreviations: ESA - Endangered Species Act; CWA- Clean Water Act; NFMA - National Forest 
Management Act; ELZ - equipment limitation zone; BA - tree basal area in ft.2/acre; DFC - desired 
future condition; Np and Ns - perennial and seasonal non-fish-bearing streams. 
# For simplicity we do not include the Olympia Experiment State Forest which has a separate riparian 
conservation strategy.  
§ For simplicity we describe only the rules for western Washington which are different than those for 
eastern Washington. 
 
 
Northwest Forest Plan 
Habitat Conservation Plan for 
Washington’s Forested 
State Trust Lands# 
Forests and Fish Report 
(Habitat Conservation Plan for 
Washington Forest Practices 
Rules)§ 
Lead Agency U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management 
Washington Department of 
Natural Resources 
Washington Department of Natural 
Resources 
Year Approved 1994 1997 1999* 
Area covered (acres) 1.8 million in Washington 1.4 million 9.3 million 
Goals 
• compliance with environmental 
laws (i.e., ESA, NFMA‡) 
• long-term health of late-
successional ecosystems 
• maximizing economic benefits  
• compliance with ESA 
• maximizing support to the trust 
beneficiaries over the long term 
• compliance with ESA 
• meet requirements of CWA 
• support harvestable supply of fish 
• economically viable timber 
industry 
Riparian 
buffer 
width 
fish-
bearing 
• two site-potential tree heights 
(≥ 200 years old) or 300 ft., 
whichever is greater 
• one site-potential tree height 
(100 years old) or 100 ft., 
whichever is greater 
• 50 or 100 ft. wind buffer when 
moderate potential for 
windthrow 
• one site-potential tree height (100 
years old)  
not fish-
bearing 
• one site-potential tree height (≥ 
200 years old) or 150 ft., 
whichever is greater 
• type 4: 100 ft. 
• type 5: protected when 
necessary 
• type Np: 50 ft. on 50 percent of 
length 
• type Np & Ns: 30 ft. ELZ  
Riparian buffer 
management • effectively no timber harvest 
3 management zones 
• 0-25 ft.: no harvest 
• 25-100 ft.: harvest ≤ 10 percent 
by volume 
• >100 ft.: harvest ≤ 25 percent 
by volume 
3 management zones 
• core (0-50 ft.): no harvest 
• inner: BA must meet DFC target 
• outer: retain 20 trees/acre  
Policy development 
process 
government agency driven, 
top-down, stakeholder 
contested 
government agency driven, 
top-down 
stakeholder driven, bottom-up, 
government facilitated 
